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ABSTRACT 
 
Do managers exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner? Good 
governance structures, which mitigate agency costs, are necessary to ensure that the accounting 
information supplied by management is not opportunistically manipulated. The output of quality 
accounting information, in turn, serves as an input to better governance structures. Thus, governance 
and earnings quality (EQ) are inexorably linked through a complementarity relationship. This suggests 
two previously unexamined relationships. Firstly, the governance effects on performance in the 
influential paper by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) is overrated without good EQ, measured by the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals (AA), as an input. I find evidence that removing firms with Low AA 
attenuates the good governance (Democracy) portfolio returns to no different from zero over the 
period of 1991-2008. Good governance per se no longer pays off. Isolating the long portfolio of 
Democracy firms with Low AA generates a positive abnormal return of 10.5 percent per year from 
1991 to 2008. Secondly, the uncertainty associated with the abnormal accruals signal is interactively 
resolved with information about the firm‟s governance structure, and the unique pairing of the signals 
contains unique information about the future prospects of the firm. Thus, firms with high or extreme 
income-increasing AA, when accompanied by weak (Dictatorship) and mixed (Drifter) governance 
structures, have negative abnormal future returns as predicted in the seminal paper by Sloan (1996), 
but Democracy firms have positive abnormal returns. The results suggest either that abnormal accruals 
are a coarse measure of EQ or earnings manipulation for good governance firms, or that their 
shareholders benefit from “earnings management” because the high abnormal accruals signals future 
performance. Overall, the results highlight the joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals 
in contributing to the total information environment to separate winners from losers.  
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1. Introduction and Motivation 
Investors willingly part their capital with managers on the assurance that the self-serving 
managers will exercise their discretionary rights appropriately to increase shareholders‟ wealth and 
not expropriate assets away. Managerial discretion can be used to make reported earnings a precise 
signal of firm value and managerial performance, enhancing the value of accounting as a language to 
communicate with the investors. Consequently, the allocation and utilization flow of capital is made 
more responsive since financial accounting information provides investors an important source of 
information to help them better evaluate the relative health and worth of the enterprise and to make 
better investment decisions. However, managerial discretion can also be used to engage in earnings 
management to conceal poor performance or to exaggerate good performance, either for career 
concerns or compensation reasons. Healy (1996) termed the former motive to be the Performance 
Measurement (or Efficient Contracting) Hypothesis, and the latter to be the Opportunistic Hypothesis.  
Accruals in accounting are estimates of future cash realizations, with considerable room for 
managerial discretion in their reporting. Most accruals reverse when the cash consequences they 
anticipate are realized and the subsequent realization of the cash has no impact on earnings. However, 
since accruals are estimates of expected future cashflows, the original accrual may not always equal 
the subsequent cash realization. In such cases, the difference between the original accrual and the 
associated future cash realization must be recognized in future earnings. Since the intriguing results in 
the seminal paper by Sloan (1996) that high or income-increasing (low or income-decreasing) 
accruals are related to negative (positive) future stock returns, evidence of high or income-increasing 
accruals have been widely interpreted and justified as bookkeeping mischief and a signal of low 
earnings quality (EQ), in favor of the Opportunistic Hypothesis. For instance, a big increase in 
inventory accruals is interpreted as signalling a greater likelihood that inventories overstate their 
associated future benefits, and implied a greater likelihood of subsequent inventory write-downs to be 
reflected in future earnings.  
Yet, accruals may also serve as leading indicators of changes in a firm‟s prospects, without 
any manipulation by managers. Since management presumably have superior information about their 
firm‟s cash generating ability, the discretion provided by GAAP in estimating accruals can be used by 
management to signal their private information to investors, so that reported earnings will more 
closely reflect firm performance than realized cashflows (Holthausen and Leftwich, 1983; Watts and 
Zimmerman, 1986; Holthausen, 1990; Healy and Palepu, 1993; Subramanyam, 1996; Bartov, Givoly, 
and Hayn, 2002). Thus, a credible signal will reduce information asymmetry, in support of the 
Performance Management Hypothesis. Given the overwhelming support of the Opportunistic 
Hypothesis, management is deemed with having nefarious intentions for purchasing inventory above 
beginning inventory levels even if this was a positive net present value decision. Joshua Livnat, 
accounting professor at the New York University‟s Stern School of Business commented that “I don‟t 
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think you can use accruals to decide whether management is acting in the best interests of 
shareholders,” and that he is “usually not happy second-guessing management or attributing to them a 
lot of sinister motives” (Trammell, 2010). 
As the output of financial accounting information is produced by management, it suggests 
that good governance structures, which mitigate agency costs and shown to be important in 
determining firm value in the influential paper by Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (GIM, 2003), are 
necessary to ensure that the accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically 
manipulated in response to a variety of incentives, and hence the signals produced by management 
can be reliably assessed by external parties. The output of EQ, in turn, serve as an input to better 
governance structures and corporate control mechanisms to improve the productivity of investments 
through three channels: one, by increasing the efficiency with which the assets in place are managed 
(governance channel); two, by reducing the error with which managers identify good versus bad 
investments (project identification); and three, by reducing the information asymmetries among 
investors and the expropriation of investors‟ wealth (adverse selection) (Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
Sloan, 2001).   
Thus, it is clear that corporate governance and financial accounting are inexorably linked 
through a complementarity relationship. Complementarity, as pointed out by Ball, Jayaraman and 
Shivakumar (2010), implies that “financial reporting usefulness depends on its contribution to the 
total information environment, whereas substitutability implies usefulness depends on the new 
information it releases on a stand-alone basis.” Thus, both governance and accruals information are 
jointly informative; each may contain information not contained in the other about the future 
prospects of the firm. Importantly, this suggests the possibility of two previously unexamined 
relationships that will be explored further in this paper.  
Firstly, I posit that governance could be overrated without abnormal accruals (AA) as an 
input. The results in GIM (2003) indicate that the hedge portfolio of buying firms with strong 
governance (Democracy), and selling firms with weak governance (Dictatorship), can generate 
significant long-term abnormal return of 8.5 percent per year over the sample period from September 
1990 to December 1999. The hedge returns are asymmetrically positioned, with 3.5 (5.0) percent from 
the long (short) position of the Democracy (Dictatorship) firms. In particular, I argue that it is 
possible that the good governance associated with future positive abnormal stock returns could be 
attenuated when the subset of Democracy firms with low or extreme income-decreasing AA is 
removed. Thus, good governance per se does not lead to future positive abnormal return, contrary to 
the findings in GIM (2003). In other words, good governance on a stand-alone basis no longer pays 
off. Isolating the Democracy firms with Low AA should also enhance significantly the governance 
effects on future positive abnormal return. In addition, mixed governance (Drifter) and Dictatorship 
firms with Low AA should have positive abnormal return. 
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In support of this view, with AA estimated as the residual in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model, I find evidence that removing firms with low or extreme income-decreasing AA will reduce 
the Democracy portfolio return to no different from zero statistically over the period of 1991-2008, 
and over the sub-period of 1991-1999 that was examined in GIM (2003). In addition, the portfolio of 
Democracy firms with Low AA generates a positive abnormal return of 10.5 percent per year from 
1991 to 2008, which is not only economically larger (700 basis points) than the long position 
documented in GIM (2003), but is also 200 basis points more than the entire hedge return. In addition, 
the incremental value in the good governance and Low AA signal yields 3.9 and 7.0 percent abnormal 
return per year respectively. Specifically, these Democracy-Low AA firms (dubbed Super-Performers) 
significantly outperform the unconditional Low AA (Democracy) firms, revealing incremental value in 
the good governance (Low AA) signal, thus lending weight to the intuition behind a complementarity 
relationship between the two signals. Interestingly, some of these Super-Performers include well-
known, institutional big-cap stocks, such as Coca-Cola Co, AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, Wyeth, 
Nordstrom, Lowe‟s, Home Depot, and EMC, formed in the portfolio at various months in the sample 
period. Drifter firms with Low AA deliver abnormal return at 6.2 percent per year; Dictatorship firms 
with Low AA have positive, albeit statistically insignificant, abnormal return.  
Of great interest and debate in the literature is the question of whether investors are able to 
“see through” transitory distortions in accrual accounting numbers. The explanation by Sloan is that 
investors are thought to be overly-fixated on earnings (the Earnings-Fixation Hypothesis), 
misinterpreting the transitory nature of the accruals information, only to be systematically surprised 
when accruals turn out, in the future, to be less persistent than cashflows. Consequently, abnormal 
stock returns result as corrections to the initial overreaction in the year immediately following 
extreme accruals. Thus, Sloan views future reversals to be a result of aggressive or “bad” accounting 
that originally inflate accruals. Accordingly, a hedge portfolio that buys (sells) firms with low (high) 
accruals can generate annualized abnormal return of 10.4 percent, with 4.9 (5.5) percent from the long 
(short) position in the subsequent year. Further evidence by Xie (2001), DeFond and Park (2001), and 
Chan, Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006) indicate that this “accruals anomaly” is related to 
abnormal, or sometimes called discretionary, accruals. They argue that certain discretionary actions 
on the part of managers induce a transitory element to accruals, with stronger mean-reverting 
tendency of discretionary accruals, defined using the Dechow et al (1996) modified Jones model, 
leading to an overpricing of aggregate accruals. However, a limitation of Sloan‟s study is that the 
returns predictability could be attributed to unidentified risk factors that is correlated with accruals or 
unknown research design flaws (Kothari, 2001). Healy (1996) pointed out that one major deficiency is 
the inability of these accruals model to “adequately incorporate the effect of changes in business 
fundamentals.” Healy and Whalen (1999) also highlighted their inadequacy to “further identify and 
explain which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which are not”. 
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Therefore, and secondly, I argue that the conventional interpretation of EQ, measured by the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals, could vary across governance structures. The uncertainty associated 
with the abnormal accruals signal - that is, managerial discretion could be interpreted as either 
opportunistic or conveying credible private signal about firm performance - is interactively resolved 
with information about the firm‟s governance structure, and the unique pairing of the signals contains 
unique information about the future prospects of the firm. Abnormal accruals, when accompanied by 
good governance, become more informative and the interactive combined signal corroborates with the 
Performance Management Hypothesis. In particular, firms with high or extreme income-increasing 
AA, usually interpreted as evidence of earnings management, will not have negative future abnormal 
return if they happen to be also Democracy firms, contrary to the predictions in Sloan (1996). Such an 
interpretation will be strengthened in an additional test if there is evidence such that when the 
portfolio of firms with revelation of high or extreme income-increasing accruals in period t 
experiences the biggest magnitude in accruals reversal in period t+1, those who are also Democracy 
firms will have positive future abnormal return, not negative return as was predicted under Sloan‟s 
hypothesis. The trend of reported earnings and the subsequent accruals reversals at these firms are 
interpreted as credible private signals of firm performance by the managers, resulting in larger 
positive future stock return, as it has been shown that earnings trend consistency is valued at a 
premium by the market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), as is consistency in benchmark performance 
(Bartov et al, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Koonce and Lipe, 2010). Firms with extreme 
income-increasing accruals, when accompanied by Dictatorship and Drifter governance structures, 
have negative future stock returns, consistent with Sloan‟s predictions.  
Corroborating evidence indicate that firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA and 
who are also Democracy firms have positive, albeit insignificant, annualized abnormal return of 3.2 
percent per year over 1991-2008. In addition, the portfolio of stocks with revelation of high or 
extreme income-increasing accruals in period t and experiences the greatest magnitude in accruals 
reversal in period t+1, and who are also Democracy firms, have positive annualized abnormal return 
of 10.8 percent. Unsurprisingly, firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA with Dictatorship 
and Drifter governance structures have negative abnormal annualized returns of 0.9 and 7.5 percent 
respectively, which are as predicted by Sloan (1996). 
The viewpoint in Sloan (1996) that high accruals is associated with negative future stock 
returns has far-reaching consequences, suggesting that it may be necessary to limit managers‟ 
discretion with respect to accounting accruals, since investors cannot unravel the valuation effect of 
reported earnings in a timely manner under current reporting standards. Such an interpretation may be 
premature. My results raise doubts that investors respond in the same manner to abnormal accruals, 
since Democracy firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA have positive future returns. This 
suggests two things: one, the level of abnormal accruals is a coarse measure of earnings manipulation 
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for these set of firms, although it appears to remain a reasonable proxy of earnings management or EQ 
for firms with mixed or poor governance structures; and two, their shareholders benefit from 
“earnings management” because the high or extreme income-increasing accruals signals future 
performance (e.g. Subramanyam, 1996; Chanel et al, 1996). The evidence helps in the understanding 
of investor behavior and whether the policy recommendations in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and 
Tuna (2005, 2006) and FASB to curtail the use of “less reliable” components of accruals are 
appropriate, especially for the Democracy firms. If the joint interactive signal of governance and 
abnormal accruals can be a more informative measure of firm performance, reforms to limit 
managerial flexibility may be counterproductive. 
This paper can be viewed as an attempt to integrate two streams of research in financial 
accounting and finance. The first stream consists of a long string of papers, sparked by the influential 
GIM (2003), which examines the governance effects on firm performance. The second stream consists 
of valuation-oriented papers, since the seminal paper by Sloan (1996), which shows that accruals 
predict future returns. Overall, the results in the two previously unexamined relationships highlight 
the joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals in contributing to the total information 
environment to separate winners from losers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature and develops the 
hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data, variable description and construction, and research 
methodology. Section 4 presents the empirical results, while Section 5 looks at the robustness test. 
Section 6 concludes. 
2.  Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
"If money is the blood and markets are the circulatory system of the global economy, then double-
entry accounting ledgers are the nerve cells that control and respond to changes in the flow of 
money."  
- Gordon Gould (2000) on "Double-Entry Accounting" in the book “The Greatest Inventions of the 
Past 2,000 Years” which is edited by John Brockman who asked the world's leading thinkers to name 
the one invention that each thought made the greatest impact on civilization in the last 2,000 years.   
 
"Financial statements are a central feature of financial reporting - a principal means of 
communicating financial information to those outside an entity"  
- FASB (1984), paragraph 5 
 
“Future research can also contribute additional evidence to further identify and explain which types 
of accruals are used for earnings management and which are not. Future research is also needed to 
determine the conditions in which discretion in financial reporting is primarily used to improve 
communication vs. manage earnings.” 
- Healy and Whalen (1999), p368 
  
Agency costs, which result from the separation of management and financing, come in many 
guises. Managers may shirk or waste resources, invest extravagantly, build empires to the detriment of 
shareholders, and engage in self-dealing behavior such as consuming perks and generating private 
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benefits (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Jensen, 1986; Djankov, La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, 2008). 
Managers may also seek to entrench themselves by designing complex cross-ownership and holding 
structures with double voting rights that make it hard for outsiders to gain control (Demsetz and Lehn, 
1985; Ang, Cole, and Lin, 2000; La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny, 2000; Gompers, Ishii, and 
Metrick, 2010), or by routinely resisting hostile takeovers, as these threaten their long-term positions 
(GIM, 2003; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Farrell, 2009).    
Information asymmetries between management and financiers create a demand for an 
internally generated measure which is an early or timely signal of firm performance to be reported for 
stewardship assessments that is not yet garbled by the future environmental noise that accrues after 
the signal is revealed but before the final outcome is realized. Financial accounting information is an 
important source of information and firm output on firm performance for ex ante resource allocation 
decisions. Standard setters define the accounting language that management uses to communicate 
with the firm's external stakeholders. By creating a framework that independent auditors1 and the SEC 
can enforce, accounting standards can provide a relatively low-cost and credible means for corporate 
managers to report information on their firms' performance to external capital providers and other 
stakeholders (Healy and Whalen, 1996). Ideally, financial reporting therefore helps the best-
performing firms (winners) in the economy to distinguish themselves from poor performers (losers) 
and facilitates efficient resource allocation and stewardship decisions by stakeholders.  
Over finite intervals, reporting realized cash flows is not necessarily informative because 
realized cash flows have timing and matching problems that cause them to be a “noisy” measure of 
firm performance. Accounting accruals, guided by the revenue recognition and matching accounting 
principles, overcome this problem that comes from measuring firm performance when firms are in 
continuous operations by altering the timing of cashflow recognition in earnings. Invented in 1494 by 
a Franciscan monk named Luca Pacioli, accruals accounting was designed to be the “nerve cell” to 
help the flourishing Venetian merchants manage their burgeoning economic empires and to serve as a 
communication tool with external parties. Dechow (1994) provide evidence that accrual accounting 
earnings are superior to cash accounting earnings at summarizing firm performance.  
Yet, as financial accounting information is a managerial output, management has discretion 
over the level of accruals (McNichols and Wilson, 1988). Since the seminal paper by Sloan (1996) 
documenting the influential result that high accruals are associated with negative future returns, most 
literature have held a scathing view on the role of accounting accruals as a discretionary device 
allowed under GAAP to give managers the flexibility to manage earnings opportunistically to 
                                                          
1 The financial reporting industry is a huge and lucrative one. In Final Report of the Advisory Committee on the Auditing 
Profession to the U.S. Department of Treasury (2008), the first major study of the U.S. auditing profession, it was reported 
that the four largest firms audit approximately 98% of the market capitalization of U.S. public companies. The Big 4 
reported approximately $90 billion in total revenues. Total revenue reported by the U.S. affiliates of the Big 4 was $31.2 
billion, of which approximately $11.8 billion (37.8%) was for audits of U.S. public companies. 
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entrench themselves (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989), either for career concerns (Murphy and Zimmerman, 
1993; Pourciau, 1993; Smith, 1993; Farrell and Whidbee, 2003) or for compensation reasons 
(Matsunaga, 1995; Balsam, 1998; Matsunaga and Park, 2001; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Cheng 
and Warfield, 2005; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Burns and Kedia, 2006; Cornett et al, 2007), 
especially with popular anecdotes of earnings management in well-publicized accounting scandals 
such as Enron and WorldCom. Thus, while accrual accounting is superior to cash accounting in 
summarizing performance, the accrual component of earnings should receive a lower weighting than 
the cash component of earnings in evaluating firm performance, due to the greater subjectivity 
involved in the estimation of accruals. This interpretation was reinforced by an earlier paper by 
Dechow et al (1995) who carried out an ex post analysis of a sample of earnings manipulations subject 
to SEC enforcement actions and find that those earnings manipulations are primarily attributable to 
accruals that reverse in the year following the earnings manipulations. As a result of this interpretation, 
the use of abnormal accruals as a proxy of earnings management or earning quality is prevalent in a 
long list of literature (for examples, see the survey paper on earnings quality by Dechow, Ge, and 
Schrand, 20092).  
However, accounting discretion in accruals can be used by management, who have superior 
information about their firm‟s cash generating ability, to signal their private information (Beaver et al, 
1989; Wahlen, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996; Beaver and Engel, 1996; Arya et al, 2003; Louis and 
Robinson, 2005) to enhance credibility and reputation (Desai et al, 2006) and consistent with 
shareholders‟ wealth maximization as efficient contracting would suggest (e.g. Malmquist, 1990). 
Also, earnings trend consistency is valued at a premium by the market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), 
as is consistency in benchmark performance (Bartov et al, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002, 
Koonce and Lipe, 2010). Skinner and Sloan (2002) showed that when a firm‟s earnings fall short of 
the analyst consensus forecast by even a small amount, it triggers a large negative stock price reaction. 
In addition, managers can manage earnings to avoid violating accounting-based debt covenants that 
would otherwise increase the cost of capital for the firm (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, 1990; Smith, 
                                                          
2 Some examples that use abnormal accruals as proxy of earnings quality or earnings management in various settings: (1) 
corporate governance e.g. Klein, 2002; Peasnell et al, 2005; Doyle, 2007; (2) audit and auditor e.g. Becker et al, 1998; 
DeFond and Subramanyam, 1998; Francis and Krishnan, 1999; Heninger, 2001; Bartov, Gul, and Tsui, 2001; DeFond and 
Park, 2001; Frankel, Johnson, and Nelson, 2002; Johnson et al, 2002; Chung and Kallapur, 2003; Gul et al, 2003; Butler et al, 
2004; Larcker and Richardson, 2004; Menon and Williams, 2004; Srinidhi and Gul, 2007; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; 
Francis and Wang, 2008; Caramanis and Lennox, 2008; (3) private equity/VC e.g. Katz, 2009; (4) ownership e.g. Haw et al, 
2004; Warfield et al, 2005; Wang, 2006; Givoly, Hayn, and Katz, 2010; (5) insider trading e.g. Aboody, Hughes, and Liu, 
2005; (6) IPO/SEO e.g. Teoh, Welch, and Wong, 1998a, 1998b; Shivakumar, 2000; Darrough and Ragan, 2005; Cohen, 
2010; (7) regulatory e.g. Ashbaugh-Skaife et al 2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009; Iliev, 2010; (8) disclosure e.g. Baber et al, 
2006; Francis, Nanda, and Olsson, 2008; Levi, 2008; Louis et al, 2008; (9) corporate investments e.g. Biddle and Hilary, 
2006; Biddle, Hillary, and Verdi, 2009; Beatty, Liao and Weber, 2010; (10) managerial compensation, turnover, and 
reputation e.g. Pourciau, 1993; Bartov and Mohanram, 2004; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Geiger, 2006; Efendi et al, 
2007; Cornett et al, 2007; Francis et al, 2008; Jiang, Petroni and Wang, 2010; (11) fraud, violation and restatements e.g. 
Beneish, 1997; Jones, Krishnan, and Melendrez, 2008; (12) benchmark performance e.g. Leone and Rock, 2002; Ayers, 
Jiang, and Yue, 2006; (13) international e.g. Pincus et al, 2007 
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1993; Sweeney, 1994). Managing earnings “appropriately” to smooth earnings3 can “save” current 
earnings for possible use in the future (DeFond and Park, 1997), increasing the informativeness of 
future earnings (Tucker and Zarowin, 2006); reduce the variability in reported earnings more when 
firms operate in high uncertainty (Ghosh and Olsen, 2009); and portray a less risky image of the firm 
(Gul et al, 2003), reducing the perceived bankruptcy probability of the firm and, hence, the firm‟s 
borrowing cost (Trueman and Titman, 1988), and these earnings smoothing actions can be beneficial 
to the firm‟s shareholders (Goel and Thakor, 2003). Demski (1998) argued that managers 
communicate acquired expertise through earnings smoothing 4 . Chaney, Jeter, and Lewis (1996) 
suggest that discretionary accruals smooth earnings and they interpret their findings as evidence that 
discretionary accruals are not opportunistic but that they communicate information about the firm‟s 
long-term (permanent) earnings to equity markets.  
Accounting accruals also serves as an input to help curb the agency problems, and to better 
governance structures and corporate control mechanisms to improve the productivity of investments 
(Bushman and Smith, 2001; Sloan, 2001). Accounting information can be used to indicate whether 
governance actions against management are required. For instance, the board uses accounting 
earnings performance as an input into their firing decisions (Weisbach, 1988). Managers also may not 
wish to inflate accruals since they are associated with heightened litigation risk (Dechow et al, 1996; 
DuCharme et al, 2004).  
Still, we do not have sufficient and conclusive evidence on whether managers exercise 
accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient manner (Dechow et al, 2009), which has been 
one of the long-standing questions of positive accounting research (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978, 
1990). There is a missing “deciphering key” that does not allow the contracting manager to describe 
ex ante the meaning of “good performance”; it is only later when the uncertainty unfolds that it 
becomes clearer what a good performance means. If accounting discretion in reporting firm 
performance could be abused by managers to entrench themselves for job security or compensation 
reasons, then it is possible that the effectiveness of internal controls, which include efficient 
                                                          
3 Some may not view the “appropriate” smoothing of earnings to be earnings management. For instance, former Microsoft 
CFO Greg Maffei, in discussing Microsoft‟s revenue deferral practices as a possible earnings smoothing device, indicated 
“unearned revenue is not managed earnings in any way, shape, or form. It‟s quite the opposite. When people talk about 
managing earnings, they think you‟ve got some hidden pocket here or there… [but Microsoft‟s deferred revenue is] entirely 
visible. It goes in under a set of rules we proclaim to analysts”, as quoted in CFO, 8/1999 (Fink, 1999). 
4 Different people know different things about an organization and nobody knows everything, a characteristic heightened by 
greater uncertainty. In such an environment, a managed earnings stream can convey more information than an unmanaged 
earnings stream (Arya et al, 2003). A smooth car ride is not only comfortable, but it also reassures the passenger about the 
driver‟s expertise. The key assumption is that a manager who works hard is both better able to run the firm and predict future 
earnings. The manager demonstrates his predictive powers, and hence his hard work, to the owner by smoothing earnings 
particularly under high uncertainty. Because earnings smoothing is an informative variable (the manager is better at it if he 
works than if he shirks), smoothing can reduce the cost of motivating the manager to work. Demski assumes what Sunder 
(1997) calls the “Conservation of Income”: the sum of accounting earnings over the firm‟s life is not affected by accounting 
choices (ignoring the effect of taxes and changes in the firm‟s opportunity set). Manipulation catches up with a manager. A 
feature of Demski‟s story is that smoothing is difficult. To smooth earnings well, the manager must be good at forecasting, 
and that requires hard work. If the manager can smooth earnings regardless of whether he works hard, then the owner is 
always better off contracting on unmanaged earnings. 
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contracting mechanisms that seek to align managerial interests with those of the shareholders, could 
curb these miscreant intentions. However, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) argued that: “In sum, internal 
control devices are not especially effective in forcing managers to abstain from non-value-maximizing 
conduct. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that external means of coercion such as hostile 
takeovers can come to play a role.”  
Thus, I argue that the missing “deciphering key” to interpreting when accounting accruals are 
used opportunistically or efficiently by managers, and even shed light on Healy‟s (1996) unanswered 
question on “which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which are not”, is the 
governance structures of the firm. One potential measurement of the “external-based” governance that 
is in the spirit of Shleifer and Vishny (1988) is the G-Index in GIM (2003), since it signals 
entrenchment via anti-takeover protections against managerial turnover. Put in another way, variation 
in the G-Index is correlated with the quality of mechanisms (i.e. the external market discipline 
imposed on managers from potential hostile takeovers) that specifically affect earnings management 
opportunities or incentives.   
Unsurprisingly, this is hardly a “new” idea. Dechow et al (1996) provide evidence on the 
corporate governance structures most commonly associated with the earnings manipulations. Given 
an incentive to manipulate, they find that having a weak governance structure is more likely to lead to 
the firm actively engaging in earnings management. Specifically, they document that firms subject to 
SEC enforcement actions are less likely to have an audit committee, more likely to have an insider-
dominated board, more likely to have a CEO who is a company founder, and more likely to have a 
CEO who is Chairman of the board. Prior literature had also investigated the association between 
accounting discretion and governance, and interpreted a negative association as evidence of 
managerial opportunism (Becker, DeFond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam 1998; Gaver, Gaver, and 
Austin, 1995; Chen and Lee 1995; Guidry, Leone, and Rock, 1999; Healy, 1999; Frankel, Johnson, 
and Nelson 2002; Klein 2002; Menon and Williams, 2004; Peasnell et al, 2005). García, García, and 
Penalva (2009) find a positive association between commonly used governance proxies for effective 
monitoring and timely loss recognition. However, all of these studies do not show that (less) excess 
accounting discretion has (positive) negative consequences for shareholders‟ wealth, or even the 
possibility that excess discretion can have positive shareholders‟ wealth effects.  
In one of the early important study by Christie and Zimmerman (1994), they assume that the 
takeover market would discipline opportunism and use this to identify a sample of firms that are likely 
to be opportunistic. They do not find evidence of accounting opportunism, thus discounting the 
Opportunistic Hypothesis and bending towards efficiency explanations. In a recent important update 
of the efficiency view using an interesting research methodology, Bowen et al (2008) find that 
managers do not systematically exploit poor governance to use accounting discretion for opportunistic 
purposes; in fact, accounting discretion is used to increase shareholder wealth, consistent with 
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efficient contracting motivations. Their conclusion was based upon their interpretation of the evidence, 
uncovered in a two-stage regression model, of a positive association between predicted excess 
accounting discretion due to governance (or the portion of accruals associated with poor governance 
in the first-stage regression) and subsequent performance as measured by future cash flow from 
operation and return on assets, in contrast to the findings in prior literature. In other words, greater 
accounting discretion is not associated with poor firm performance. Thus, the study by Bowen et al 
(2008) was the first to go a step further to document the consequences of excess accounting discretion 
that is due to poor governance on subsequent firm operating performance. 
I argue that these studies, whether in favor of the Opportunistic or Performance Management 
(or Efficient Contracting) story, have two limitations. Firstly, with the exception of the recent paper 
by Garcia et al (2009), most, if not all, of the studies in the past had concentrated on or were seduced 
by the “dark side” of the governance, that is, the association between accounting discretion and poor 
governance (and its consequences on subsequent firm performance as examined in Bowen et al, 2008), 
but missed out on exploring the “light side”, that is, the discretionary actions undertaken by the 
efficient managers when connected to the good governance mechanism, and the consequent 
implications on shareholders‟ wealth. Secondly, and surprisingly, none of the studies thus far had 
investigated the possibility of how accounting accruals discretion and governance can interactively 
combine to become a more informative unique signal, beyond what each signal can reveal 
individually, to impact shareholders‟ wealth. This latter point will be elaborated upon in the next 
paragraphs to lead to the main hypotheses of the paper. An interpretation and conclusion on whether 
there is managerial opportunism or efficiency from accounting discretion will be incomplete and 
premature without addressing these two concerns. 
Financial accounting information is an output produced by management. This suggests that 
the presence and input of good governance structures, which mitigate agency costs and shown to be 
important in determining firm value in the influential paper by GIM (2003), are necessary to ensure 
that the accounting information supplied by management is not opportunistically manipulated in 
response to a variety of incentives. Signals produced by management can therefore be reliably 
assessed by external parties. The output of earnings quality (EQ), in turn, serve as an input to better 
governance structures and corporate control mechanisms to improve the productivity of investments 
through three channels: one, by increasing the efficiency with which the assets in place are managed 
(governance channel); two, by reducing the error with which managers identify good versus bad 
investments (project identification); and three, by reducing the information asymmetries among 
investors and the expropriation of investors‟ wealth (adverse selection) (Bushman and Smith, 2001; 
Sloan, 2001).  Bushman et al (2004) also document an inverse association between measures of the 
informativeness of accounting numbers and governance. In particular, they posit that firms that 
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produce accounting information of limited transparency place a higher burden in governance 
structures to overcome this shortcoming.  
Thus, it is clear that corporate governance and financial accounting are inexorably linked 
through a complementarity relationship. Complementarity, as pointed out by Ball, Jayaraman and 
Shivakumar (2010), implies that “financial reporting usefulness depends on its contribution to the 
total information environment, whereas substitutability implies usefulness depends on the new 
information it releases on a stand-alone basis.” Thus, both governance and accruals information are 
jointly informative; each may contain information not contained in the other about the future 
prospects of the firm. Importantly, this suggests the possibility of two previously unexamined 
relationships that will be developed into three main hypotheses.  
Firstly, I posit that governance could be overrated without Low AA as an input. The results in 
GIM (2003) indicate that the hedge portfolio of buying firms with strong governance (Democracy), 
and selling firms with weak governance (Dictatorship), can generate significant long-term abnormal 
return of 8.5 percent per year over the sample period from September 1990 to December 1999. The 
hedge return are asymmetrically positioned, with 3.5 (5.0) percent from the long (short) position of 
the Democracy (Dictatorship) firms. In particular, I argue that it is possible that the good governance 
associated with future positive abnormal stock returns could be attenuated when the subset of 
Democracy firms with Low AA is removed. Thus, good governance per se does not lead to future 
positive abnormal return, contrary to the findings in GIM (2003). In other words, good governance on 
a stand-alone basis no longer pays off. Isolating the Democracy firms with Low AA should also 
enhance significantly the governance effects on future positive abnormal return. Moreover, the 
positive abnormal return for the Democracy-Low AA firms should be significantly larger than those of 
the unconditional Low AA (Democracy) firms, which indicate an incremental value in the governance 
(Low AA) signal, lending further weight to the intuition that corporate governance and abnormal 
accruals are inexorably linked through a complementarity relationship. In addition, mixed governance 
(termed Drifter) and Dictatorship firms with Low AA should have positive abnormal return. Thus, 
Hypothesis 1, stated in its alternative form, is as follow: 
H1a:  Good governance (Democracy) without being accompanied by Low AA is not associated with 
positive abnormal return. 
H1b:  Democracy accompanied by Low AA is associated with highly significant positive abnormal 
return. 
H1c: Democracy accompanied by Low AA have larger positive abnormal return as compared to the 
unconditional Low AA (Democracy) firms, highlighting the incremental value in the good 
governance (Low AA) signal; corporate governance and abnormal accruals are inexorably 
linked through a complementarity relationship. 
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H1d:  Mixed governance (Drifter) and poor governance (Dictatorship) accompanied by Low AA are 
associated with positive abnormal return. 
Of great interest and debate in the literature is the question of whether investors are able to 
“see through” transitory distortions in accrual accounting numbers. The explanation by Sloan is that 
investors are thought to be overly-fixated on earnings (the Earnings-Fixation Hypothesis), 
misinterpreting the transitory nature of the accruals information, only to be systematically surprised 
when accruals turn out, in the future, to be less persistent than cashflows. Consequently, abnormal 
stock returns result as corrections to the initial overreaction in the year immediately following 
extreme accruals. Thus, Sloan views future reversals to be a result of aggressive or “bad” accounting 
that originally inflate accruals. Accordingly, a hedge portfolio that buys (sells) firms with low (high) 
accruals can generate abnormal return of 10.4 percent, with 4.9 (5.5) percent from the long (short) 
position in the subsequent year. Further evidence by Xie (2001), DeFond and Park (2001) and Chan, 
Chan, Jegadeesh, and Lakonishok (2006) indicate that this “accruals anomaly” is related to abnormal, 
or sometimes called discretionary, accruals5. They argue that certain discretionary actions on the part 
of managers induce a transitory element to accruals, with stronger mean-reverting tendency of 
discretionary accruals, defined using the Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) modified Jones model, 
leading to an overpricing of aggregate accruals.  
However, a limitation of Sloan‟s study is that the returns predictability could be attributed to 
unidentified risk factors that is correlated with accruals or unknown research design flaws (Kothari, 
2001). Healy (1996) pointed out that one major deficiency is the inability of these accruals model to 
“adequately incorporate the effect of changes in business fundamentals”. Healy added that since the 
residual accruals estimated by accruals model could arise due to changes in business fundamentals 
and because of ex post management forecast errors, and the models are accrual expectations models 
rather than models of discretionary accruals, he would change the label from “discretionary” to 
“abnormal” if he were to rewrite his influential paper (1985) about the opportunistic behavior of 
managers. Healy and Whalen (1999) also highlighted their inadequacy to “further identify and explain 
which types of accruals are used for earnings management and which are not”. 
Therefore, and secondly, I argue that the conventional interpretation of EQ, measured by the 
magnitude of abnormal accruals, could vary across governance structures. The noise and uncertainty 
associated with the abnormal accruals signal - that is, managerial discretion could be interpreted as 
either opportunistic or conveying credible private signal about firm performance - is interactively 
                                                          
5 The size and persistence of these abnormal returns from accruals is “pervasive” and generally considered one of the most 
compelling pieces of evidence against market efficiency (Fama and French, 2008). BusinessWeek in 1/07 reported that 
“Earnings quality has been Barclays Global Investors‟ (BGI) single largest source of alpha over the last decade”. In the 
forthcoming Journal of Accounting & Economics survey paper “Accounting Anomalies and Fundamental Analysis: A 
Review of Recent Research Advances” by Richardson, Tuna and Wysocki (2009), eight (two) out of the top ten papers on 
anomalies and fundamental analysis that were published in accounting (all) top-tier journals with the highest average 
citations per year since 1995 relate to the accruals anomaly. 
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resolved with information about the firm‟s governance structure, and the unique pairing of the signals 
contains unique information about the future prospects of the firm. Abnormal accruals, when 
accompanied by good governance, become more informative and the interactive combined signal 
corroborates with the Performance Management Hypothesis. In particular, firms with high or extreme 
income-increasing AA, usually interpreted as engaging in earnings management, will not have 
negative future abnormal return if they happen to be also Democracy firms, contrary to the predictions 
in Sloan (1996). Firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA, when accompanied by 
Dictatorship and Drifter governance structures, have negative future stock returns, consistent with 
Sloan‟s predictions. Thus, Hypothesis 2, stated in its alternative form, is as follow: 
H2a: High AA accompanied by good governance (Democracy) are associated with positive future 
abnormal return.  
H2b: Low AA accompanied by mixed governance (Drifter) or poor governance (Dictatorship) are 
associated with negative future abnormal return.  
 Low AA  Mixed AA High AA 
 
Democracy 
 
++ ? + 
Drifter 
 
+ ? - - 
Dictatorship + 
 
? - 
Thus, the predicted associations from the two hypotheses are summarized in the above 
diagram for ease of reference in subsequent discussion and analyses. The signs in the table denote the 
direction of the association with future abnormal return; while the number of signs indicates the 
magnitude and significance of the abnormal return, where two positive (negative) signs denote highly 
positive (negative) future returns. I make no predictions on the direction of the associations for the 
firms with mixed AA.   
The evidence from H2 if rejected in its null form will be strengthened in an additional test if 
there is evidence as follow: when the portfolio of firms with revelation of high or extreme income-
increasing accruals in period t experiences the biggest magnitude in accruals reversal in period t+1, 
those who are also Democracy firms will have positive future abnormal return, not negative return as 
was predicted under Sloan‟s hypothesis. The trend of reported earnings and the subsequent accruals 
reversals at these firms are interpreted as credible private signals of firm performance by the managers, 
resulting in larger positive future stock returns, as it has been shown that earnings trend consistency is 
valued at a premium by the market (Barth, Elliott, and Finn, 1999), as is consistency in benchmark 
performance (Bartov et al, 2002; Kasznik and McNichols, 2002; Koonce and Lipe, 2010). Thus, 
Hypothesis 3, stated in its alternative form, is as follow: 
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H3: Good governance (Democracy) firms with revelation of high or extreme income-increasing 
abnormal accruals in period t that experiences the biggest magnitude in accruals reversal in 
period t+1 are associated with positive future abnormal return. 
Recently, and increasingly, the results in GIM (2003) are being challenged as artifacts of 
either asset pricing model misspecification or unexpected industry performance, and the excess 
returns were not significantly different from zero after controlling for industry clustering effects 
(Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu, 2009). Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) find that neither analysts 
nor investors were surprised by differences in operating performance across Democracy or 
Dictatorship firms, and resolve the puzzle of apparent nonzero long-term abnormal return in the 
absence of firm-specific surprises. Core et al (2006) also showed that the relative performance of 
good and bad governance portfolios reverses following the GIM sample period with the good 
governance portfolio underperforming the bad governance portfolio over the period 2000-2003. 
Bebchuk, Cohen and Wang (2010) showed that the abnormal return associated with the G-Index 
during the post-GIM period of 2000-2008 had disappeared. Bebchuk et al (2010) argued that this 
result could be due to market participants‟ learning to appreciate the difference between firms scoring 
well and poorly on the governance indices after the publication of the results in GIM. Cremers and 
Nair (2005) examined how the simultaneous consideration of two different governance mechanisms – 
takeover vulnerability and shareholder activism – is crucial for the documented abnormal return in 
GIM (2003); they found that the portfolio that buys Democracy firms and shorts Dictatorship firms 
generates abnormal return only when public pension fund (blockholder) ownership is high as well. In 
addition, prominent commercial governance ratings are found to have limited or no success in 
predicting firm performance, restatements, security litigation and other outcomes of interest to 
shareholders (Daines, Gow, and Larcker, 2010). Until GIM (2003), literature on individual 
governance characteristics had not identified a conclusive systematic relation to firm performance, 
and these recent observations reflect the extreme difficulty in distilling all of the complex governance 
mechanisms into a single, integrated, yet informative overall score, with econometrics issues of 
governance as an endogenous firm choice, correlated omitted variables and measurement errors 
complicating the relationship (Larcker, Richardson, and Tuna, 2007; Larcker and Rusticus, 2010).  
This paper is the first, to the best of my knowledge, to attempt to empirically resolve this 
long-standing tense debate regarding the relationship between governance and firm performance, and 
show that both the supporters and the sceptics of the results in GIM (2003) are not incorrect by 
pointing out that this “performance gap” in governance can be closed by extending the analysis 
beyond using corporate governance rating on a stand-alone basis, particularly by considering the 
interactive effects of abnormal accruals and governance which yield a more informative combined 
private signal about firm value.  
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The observant reader will notice that there is a striking similarity with both the governance 
and accruals trading strategy in GIM (2003) and Sloan (1996). Both of the documented abnormal 
returns are concentrated on the short side. Without an economically significant positive return to the 
long position in the Democracy and extreme income-decreasing accruals portfolio, it is possible that 
the hedge returns no longer exceeds transaction costs, especially given the high transaction costs, 
limits to arbitrage and short-selling constraints associated with taking a short position (Shleifer and 
Vishny, 1997; Jones and Lamont, 2002; Boehmer et al, 2009). University of Notre Dame professor of 
finance Tim Loughran commented in the CFA Digest that he is “always suspicious of anomalies that 
seem to be focused on the short side” (Trammell, 2010). Loughran related how he wanted to short 
Krispy Kreme, but was told by his broker that it is not possible because “every single share that‟s 
available to be shorted has been shorted”. In addition, it appears that the predictive returns from 
employing the accruals strategy is dissipating, as what Ron Kahn, Barclays Global Investors (BGI) 
then global head of research, stated in Financial Times in 1/2009 that “buying companies with high 
quality earnings and shorting those most dependent on accruals proved a good strategy, until the 
market figured it out” (Skypala, 2009). Green, Hand, and Soliman (2009) extended the time period 
five years beyond the 2003 endpoint used by Lev and Nissim (2006) and Mashruwala et al (2006) and 
found that abnormal accruals is no longer an effective predictor of future stock returns because the 
anomalous returns are arbitraged away by hedge fund investors deploying greater capital, an 
estimated peak dollar investments of almost $60 billion in 2007, in exploiting this signal to the point 
that they are no longer positive. Thus, a firm with Low AA may even have poor future stock 
performance if too many investors crowd around a similar trading strategy of buying firms with Low 
AA. 
Therefore, this paper also restores the viability of both investment strategies by documenting 
how the long position in Democracy firms with Low AA – the Super-Performers - generates abnormal 
annualized return of 10.5 percent over 1991-2008, well in excess of possible transaction costs. 
3. Data, Variable Description, and Research Methodology 
3.1  Measure of governance and abnormal stock returns 
The data for this study is drawn from the eight volumes published by the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) that have a governance index score (G-Index) and financial 
and stock price data from CRSP/Compustat Merged database (CCM) and CRSP database respectively. 
The G-Index is based on 24 IRRC provisions which restrict shareholder rights, and a higher score is 
viewed as representing poorer governance. The score of the G-Index ranges from 1 to 24, and GIM 
(2003) classified companies with G-Index less than or equal to 5 as the „Democracy’ portfolio, while 
those with a score of 14 and above are classified as „Dictatorship’ portfolio. The volumes were 
published on the following dates: September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, November 
1999, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006. The data in the 2008 RiskMetrics governance 
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volume was not used because it is not comparable with data in the earlier IRRC volumes6. Following 
GIM (2003) and subsequent literature, I exclude dual-class firms because of the unique governance 
structures and regulations prevailing for these sets of firms. Following this, the number of firms (at 
each publication date) is as follows: 1,303 (1990), 1,303 (1993), 1,333 (1995), 1,642 (1998), 1,492 
(2000), 1,588 (2002), 1,675 (2004), 1,619 (2006). An annual time series of the G-Index is constructed 
using the forward-fill method of GIM (2003) by assuming that the governance provisions remain 
unchanged from the current date of on volume until the current date of the next volume. Given the 
relatively stability of G-Index over time, GIM (2003) argue that any measurement noise using the 
forward-fill method is likely to be relatively minor. Data in the last IRRC volume of 2006 are filled to 
the end of 2008. Thus, the sample period in this study is from September 1991 to December 2008. 
Each firm‟s G-index is matched with its monthly returns (including dividends) from CRSP, and a 
value-weighted portfolio is constructed. Portfolios are rebalanced at the beginning of each month and 
governance data is updated whenever information in a new IRRC volume becomes available. 
Abnormal stock returns is captured by the estimated intercept, “alpha”, using Fama-French 
(1993) three-factor model and includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor UMD calculated from 
WRDS7. For each calendar month, the value-weighted average return to portfolios of firms grouped 
into deciles of portfolios sorted by the G-Index is calculated, according to the most recent value of the 
G-Index. The excess monthly returns are regressed on the four factors as mentioned:  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt       (1) 
where Rt is the return of the governance portfolio in excess of the risk-free rate (one-month Treasury 
bill) in month t, or (Ri – Rf)t; RMRFt is the month t value-weighted market return minus the risk-free 
rate, and the terms SMBt (small minus big), HMLt (high minus low), and UMDt are the month t returns 
on zero-investment factor-mimicking portfolios designed to capture size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects, respectively. Thus, the estimated intercept α is the abnormal return in excess of 
what could have been achieved by passive investments in the factors8.  
Following GIM (2003), I replicate their main results in Table VI using their four-factor 
calendar time portfolio method using equity returns from September 1991 to December 19999. My 
                                                          
6 In 2007, RiskMetrics acquired IRRC and revamped its data collection methods; consequently, changes were made both in 
the set of provisions covered and in the definitions of some of the covered provisions. For example, only 18 of the 24 
provisions in the G-Index are covered by the 2008 volume of the RiskMetrics governance data.  
7 Fama and French (1996) find that many of the anomalies identified in the past largely disappear when their three-factor 
model in Fama and French (1993) is used to examine them. Kothari (2001) commented that the measurement problem of 
long-horizon performance measurement is exacerbated when the cumulation period is extended. Kothari (2001) argues that 
regardless of whether the models by Fama and French (1993) are empirically motivated, it is important to control for factors 
identified in their models to determine whether the treatment variable or event is generating the abnormal returns. 
8 As pointed out by prior studies (e.g. Fama and French, 1993; Carhart, 1997; Larcker et al, 2005, 2007), since the dependent 
variable is excess returns, the benchmark returns are already included in the computation and additional control variables are 
not included.  
9 In the original GIM (2003), the authors calculated their momentum returns themselves using the procedures of Carhart 
(1997). It has been found in subsequent studies (e.g. Johnson, Moorman, and Sorescu, 2009) that the results were highly 
sensitive to the use of either the Carhart‟s PY1YR factor or Ken French‟s UMD factor to compute the momentum returns. 
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results are similar and are not presented. The results in GIM (2003) revealed that the positive monthly 
alpha for the Democracy portfolio, the group of firms with a G-Index of 5 or less, is a statistically 
significant 0.29 percent. The portfolios with G-Index of 6 and 7 also generate qualitatively similar 
positive monthly alpha of 0.22 and 0.24 percent respectively, albeit statistically insignificant.  Given 
that the original Democracy portfolio comprise of only around 9 percent of the sample data on 
average, and that it is highly likely that there will be heightened attention on corporate governance in 
the post-GIM sample period, I extended the sample size of the Democracy portfolio by including 
firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as 
firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent 
of the sample on average. Importantly, as one of my key tests is to examine whether isolating 
Democracy firms with Low Abnormal Accruals (AA) as an input will enhance significantly the 
governance effects on returns (H1b), such a re-classification is biased against my findings. In addition, 
I wish to show that Drifter and Dictatorship can have positive abnormal return as well (H1c), and 
such re-grouping will again be biased against my results. Likewise, the negative monthly alpha for the 
Dictatorship portfolio, the group of firms with a G-Index of 14 and above and comprising 5.5 percent 
of the sample on average in GIM (2003), is a statistically significant 0.42 percent; those with G-Index 
of 13 and 12 have qualitatively similar negative monthly alpha at 0.01 and 0.25 respectively.  In the 
same fashion, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship, now comprising 
20.0 percent of the sample on average. Firms with a G-Index between 8 and 11 comprise 52.1 percent 
of the sample on average, and they are termed Drifter. GIM (2003) and all the subsequent literature on 
governance made no mention about these Drifter firms even though they are the bulk of the sample 
size. The properties of the Drifter are deliberately examined to test whether Drifter with Low AA can 
also enjoy a valuation premium with positive future abnormal return just like the Democracy firms 
(H1d).   
3.2 Measures of earnings quality 
There is no one measure of earnings quality (EQ), a multi-faceted term, which is universally 
agreed upon (Dechow, Schrand and Ge, 2009). The EQ measures are selected based on the measures‟ 
value relevance – the ability to explain variation in contemporaneous stock returns – because value 
relevance is generally viewed in the literature as a direct estimate of the measure‟s usefulness in 
equity investors‟ decision making (e.g. Collins et al, 1997; Francis and Schipper, 1999; Lev and 
Zarowin, 1999; Barton, Hansen and Pownall, 2010). Moreover, the FASB considers “relevance” as a 
primary quality that makes accounting information useful to investors (FASB, 1980; Barth, Beaver 
and Landsman, 2001; Holthausen and Watts, 2001). Below is a description of the two models of EQ 
that were considered. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Specifically, the hedged Democracy-Dictatorship portfolio returns were either reduced or rendered statistically insignificant 
when the UMD factor is used. Again, to be conservative, I use the factor UMD that is biased against my findings.   
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3.2.1 Abnormal accruals in Dechow and Dichev (2002) model   
The use of the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model has become the accepted methodology in 
accounting to capture discretion (e.g. Francis et al, 2005; Dechow, Ge, Schrand, 2010). Dechow and 
Dichev derived working capital accrual quality based on the following firm-level time-series 
regression10:  
∆WC = β0 + β1CFOt-1 + β2CFOt + β3CFOt+1 + εt        (2) 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) took the position that earnings mapping more closely to operating 
cash flows is of higher quality. The residuals from the regression reflect the accruals that are unrelated 
to cash flow realizations. The magnitude of these residuals is a firm-year measure of accruals quality, 
where higher value of the residuals denotes lower quality11. The underlying assumption is that if a 
performance measure is closer to the firm‟s cash flows, then accrual accounting – and therefore 
managers‟ judgments and estimates – will have less of an effect on the reported performance 
measures. The measure attempts to isolate the managed or error component of accruals. Measures that 
are closer to operating cashflows have greater value relevance. The Dechow and Dichev (2002) model 
appears to provide better estimates of abnormal accruals than other models, and it has much higher 
explanatory power than the modified Jones model (and its various extensions) and much lower 
variability in the error term. Jones et al (2008) provide evidence indicating superiority of the Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model over competing models. Specifically, they show that this model exhibits the 
strongest association with the existence and magnitude of fraud and non-fraud restatements, and 
therefore performs better than other models in estimating abnormal accruals. 
The CFO (Compustat item OANCF) is derived from the Statement of Cash Flows reported 
under the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 95 (SFAS No. 95, FASB 1987), given the 
results in Collins and Hribar (2002) showing that the balance-sheet approach to deriving CFO leads to 
noisy and biased estimates. The change in working capital from year t-1 to t (∆WC) is computed as 
∆AR + ∆Inventory - ∆AP - ∆TP + ∆Other Assets (net), where AR is accounts receivables, AP is 
accounts payable, and TP is taxes payable. Specifically, ∆WC is calculated from Compustat items as 
∆WC = - (RECCH + INVCH + APALCH + TXACH + AOLOCH). All variables are scaled by average 
total assets. Following Dechow and Dichev (2002), I replicate their main findings in Table 3 and 
Table 4 using data from their sample period of 1987-1999. My results are very similar and are not 
presented. 
                                                          
10 Consistent with prior literature (e.g. Francis et al, 2005) and throughout this section in the computation of the measures of 
earnings quality as proxied by abnormal accruals, I winsorize the extreme values of the distribution of each variable in the 
regression model to the 1 and 99 percentiles to ensure that the results are not driven by outliers. 
11  Hribar and Nichols (2007) pointed out using unsigned or absolute abnormal accruals as a measure of earnings 
management will increase the expected value of absolute abnormal accruals due to a lack of fit in the estimation of abnormal 
accruals, and hence can bias tests in favor of rejecting the null hypothesis of earnings management. They propose the use of 
signed abnormal accruals as a more conservative test of earnings management, where significant results are obtained in spite 
of the noise in the estimation of abnormal accruals. Dechow and Ge (2006) also commented that the sign of the accruals is 
important: “earnings persistence is affected by both the magnitude and sign of accruals.” 
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Ten decile portfolios sorted and ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the regression 
model in (2) are formed three months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial 
statements are publicly available12. The portfolio of firm-months with the lowest (highest) value in 
residuals is given an abnormal accruals (AA) score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting 
the firms into the three categories of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and 
below is re-classified as “Low or Income-Decreasing AA”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are 
classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or 
Income-Increasing AA”.  
3.2.2 Abnormal accruals in the modified Jones model by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1996) 
In the original Jones (1991) model, total accruals and working capital accruals are explained 
as a function of sales growth (Compustat item change in REVT) and plant, property & equipment 
(PPEGT) respectively, and all variables are scaled by lagged total assets. The modified Jones model 
by Dechow, Sloan and Sweeney (1995) is adjusted for growth in credit sales (Compustat item change 
in RECT), which are frequently manipulated: 
TACCt = α + β1(∆REVTt - ∆RECTt)+ β2PPEGTt + + εt       (3) 
The power of the Jones‟ model is increased by this modification, yielding a residual that is 
uncorrelated with expected (i.e. normal) revenue accruals and better reflects revenue manipulation13.  
TACC is computed as change in current assets (Compustat item change in ACT), minus change in 
current liabilities (Compustat item change in LCT), minus change in cash (Compustat item change in 
CH), plus change in short-term debt (Compustat item change in DLC), minus depreciation (Compustat 
item DEPN)14. The approach used in sorting and ranking the residuals in the modified Jones model in 
                                                          
12 Alford and Zmijewski (1994) report that there is violation and extension of the mandatory SEC Form 10-K filing 
requirement for around 20 percent of their sample over the period 1978-1985, and prior studies such as Sloan (1996) ranked 
their sample firms into deciles based on the magnitude of their scaled abnormal accruals four months after the fiscal year end, 
arguing that by this time, almost all firms‟ financial statements are publicly available. However, as pointed out by Green, 
Hand, and Soliman (2009), it is increasingly common for firms to voluntarily report both earnings and cash flows at their 
quarterly and annual earnings announcements, well prior to the mandatory 10-Q and 10-K filing dates. Real-time data 
providers such as Compustat and FactSet have also increased the amount of detailed information they provide to their clients 
and the speed at which they provide it. With this contemporary view, Green et al (2009) used three months after the fiscal 
year end to do their ranking. As a robustness check, I find that my results are not quantitatively or qualitatively affected 
when I use four months after the fiscal year end in the ranking exercise; in fact, some of the key results are stronger and I 
report the more conservative set of results.    
13 Collins and Hribar (2002) use an alternative measure of accruals that is based on the statement of cash flows, rather than 
from the balance sheet approach advocated in Sloan (1996). They argue that firms that have undergone a merger and 
acquisition (or divestiture) are more likely to have high (or low) accruals. Since the subsequent stock returns of firms 
involved in M&As tend to be below average, high accruals may be associated with poor future returns. They term this as the 
“non-articulation problem”. Ball and Shivakumar (2008) argued forcefully that the results in Teoh, Welch and Wong (1998a, 
1998b) are due to this non-articulation problem, and doubt the use of abnormal accruals in studies that involve large 
transactional events, such as an IPO/SEO. My study does not involve the setting of examining earnings quality around a 
major transactional event. Further robustness checks using the cash flow approach advocated by Collins and Hribar (2002) 
does not affect my results qualitatively as well. 
14 Instead of TACC, some studies use WACC, or working capital accrual, which is computed without subtracting depreciation. 
As pointed out by Richardson et al (2005), there is considerable subjectivity involved in selecting an amortization schedule 
for PP&E. The depreciation/amortization method, the useful life, and the salvage value are all subjective decisions that 
impact this accrual category. PP&E are subject to periodic write-downs when they are determined to have been impaired. 
The estimation of the amount of these impairments involves great subjectivity. For example, the well publicized accounting 
scandal at WorldCom involved billions of dollars of operating costs that were aggressively capitalized as PP&E. I find that 
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equation (3) and re-classifying the firm-months into the three categories of AA is similar to that as 
described for the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model in Section 3.2.1.  
3.3   Measures of accruals reversal 
Following Allen, Larson, and Sloan (2010), I define accruals reversal (ACCREVt+1) as the 
difference between accruals in the current period and accruals in the previous period, with the 
accruals being estimated as either ∆WC in equation (2) in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model, or 
TACC in equation (3) in the modified Jones model. The implicit assumption in this definition is that 
accruals are expected to reverse within the next year as has been documented empirically in many 
studies (e.g. Sloan, 1996; Bradshaw et al, 2001)15. For instance, a negative accruals reversal involves 
the revelation of high or extreme income-increasing accruals (e.g. boosting inventory accruals) in 
period t – conventionally interpreted as evidence of earnings management or poor EQ – and the 
reversal into negative accruals (e.g. inventory writedown) in period t+1. The magnitude of 
ACCREVt+1 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the end of each fiscal 
year, and then matched with the monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. Again, a similar approach as 
described in the earlier sections is used to re-classify the ten portfolios into three portfolio categories: 
big net negative accruals reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal), mixed accruals reversal (Mixed 
Accruals Reversal), and big net positive accruals reversal (Positive Accruals Reversal). I am 
particularly interested in testing the hypothesis, stated in its alternative form, of whether the abnormal 
return or monthly alpha in the association between both positive and negative accruals reversal and 
future stock returns is significantly positive (H3), contrary to the negative returns in Sloan‟s view. 
4.  Empirical Results  
4.1 Summary statistics 
 Before examining the returns on the stocks sorted two-dimensionally by governance and 
abnormal accruals (AA) to test out the three key hypotheses highlighted in the previous section, I first 
look at the usual firm characteristics for the unconditional portfolios sorted along the single dimension 
of either governance or AA. These firm characteristics include: Market cap (in millions), calculated 
monthly as shares outstanding times the month-end share price; Price, which is a common proxy in 
for transaction costs as it has been documented in prior literature that low-priced stocks have higher 
trading costs; Turnover is the monthly number of shares traded relative to the number of shares 
outstanding; BM or book-to-market is the book value equity per share relative to the month-end share 
price; PE or price-earnings ratio is end-of-fiscal-year share price relative to EPS; Div or dividend 
yield is dividend per share relative to share price; Sales Growth; ROA or return on assets is income 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
my results are not affected qualitatively from using TACC or WACC, and I report TACC in the empirical results in Section 4 
for the reasons highlighted above and for comparability with other studies which mostly use TACC (e.g. see the 
comprehensive survey by Dechow et al, 2009). 
15 Allen et al (2010) further argued that their use of current accruals in their empirical analysis can help them to mitigate 
concerns about loss of power from the omission of longer-term reversals.  
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before extraordinary items relative to average total assets; Leverage is total net debt relative to total 
assets; R&D, research and expenditure expense relative to sales; Capex1 is capital expenditure 
relative to sales; Capex2 is capital expenditure relative to average total assets; Deferred Revenue is  
deferred current revenue (Compustat item DRC) relative to average total assets; and Special Item is 
special items relative to average total assets.   
4.1.1 Characteristics of abnormal accruals portfolio 
From Panel A of Table 1, the median size for the firms in the High AA portfolio is bigger with 
a market cap at $963 million, as compared to $835 million for firms in the low accruals portfolio. 
Firms in the High AA portfolio have relatively higher share price, slightly higher trading intensity 
based on turnover, lower book-to-market ratio, quite similar PE ratio, lower dividend yield, higher 
sales growth, surprisingly relatively higher operating performance as measured by return on asset 
(ROA), relatively similar debt leverage ratio, lower R&D investments, higher capex spending, higher 
deferred revenue, and larger negative special items. There is a slightly higher operating performance 
in the previous year for High AA, while there is deterioration (improvement) in ROA in the following 
year for High AA (Low AA). There is no difference in the average governance quality between the two 
sets of firms as measured by the G-Index16.  
Most of my results are similar to prior literature findings, and also consistent with the popular 
“growth explanation” for the accruals anomaly with high accruals firm having higher sales growth 
and higher investments (capital expenditure). Fairfield et al (2003) and Zhang (2007) argue that the 
negative future returns associated with high accruals are due to diminishing returns on investments, 
since the measurement of accruals are scaled by average total assets, and therefore high accruals could 
be capturing high investments or growth. In their iconic study, Lakonishok, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) 
argue that investors extrapolate past strong growth information too far into the future, and as a result, 
stock prices tend to reverse for growth firms. Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004) suggests that firms with 
high capital expenditures tend to be overinvesting, and therefore, earn lower future stock returns. 
Cooper, Gulen, and Schill (2008) document a negative relation between asset growth and returns. 
Fama and French (1995, 1996) suggest that growth firms could be financially distressed and hence 
investors are compensated with lower expected returns. My results appear to suggest that firms with 
high abnormal accruals may not be financially distressed since they are relatively bigger in size and 
have better operating performance. A key difference with prior literature is that I am restricted to 
                                                          
16 Interestingly, this could be a possible reason why none of the prior literature had examined the joint importance of 
governance and abnormal accruals in returns predictability; even though the research methodology – essentially sorting the 
firms along the two dimensions of performance measures - is not too complicated. Together with the common knowledge 
that governance and accounting quality might be positively correlated with each another (the Pearson correlation coefficient 
between the G-Index and abnormal accruals in Dechow and Dichev (2002) is significantly positive at 0.014), some of the 
unique information in the unique pairing of the signals are hidden in the statistical averages. Simply controlling for corporate 
governance as an independent variable in multiple regression models might not be appropriate since the regression 
orthogonalizes the independent variables with respect to one another, and any unique information that comes from the 
combination of both information are not captured in the coefficients.  
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stocks with data on a G-Index score, which limits my sample size to around 1,500 firms on average 
per year over 1991-2008. Caylor (2010) find that managers use discretion in deferred revenue to avoid 
negative earnings surprises. Interestingly, the high accruals firm in my sample have higher deferred 
revenue (5.8 percent of average total assets), which could suggest that they are also opportunistically 
manipulating deferred revenue.  
Dechow and Ge (2006) find that low accrual firms are more likely to have negative non-cash 
special items, such as an asset write-off. These low accrual firms with negative special items have 
higher ROA and higher positive future abnormal returns, and they interpret the results to mean that 
accounting accruals decisions by managers to take a one-time charge is a signal that it is taking 
actions to turn the firm around. Also, they infer that investors fail to understand that these negative 
special items are transitory and exhibit low earnings persistence, and thus, the accruals anomaly is 
more pronounced for these firms. I find that the Low AA firms in my sample have negative special 
items (1.1 percent of average total assets) and ROA improves in the following year, consistent with 
Dechow and Ge (2006).  
4.1.2 Characteristics of governance quality portfolio 
From Panel B of Table 1, the median size for the firms in the Democracy portfolio is 
surprisingly smaller with a market cap at $918 million, as compared to $1.6 billion in Dictatorship, as 
it is often thought that bigger firms have more resources to spend on installing corporate governance 
practices. Democracy firms have relatively lower share price, higher turnover, quite similar book-to-
market ratio, higher PE ratio, lower dividend yield, higher sales growth, less leverage, higher R&D, 
higher capex, higher deferred revenue, and relatively similar slight negative special items. 
Surprisingly, there is no significant difference in the comparison of current and next-period operating 
performance (ROA) for both sets of firms.   
4.2 Baseline results 
Table 2 shows the monthly intercepts or alphas in the Fama-French-Carhart regressions for 
the portfolios double-sorted independently by governance quality and abnormal accruals (AA) 
measured using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model17. The intercepts, which indicate abnormal 
future returns, have been multiplied by 100 so that they can be interpreted as percentages.  
                                                          
17 Sorting the firms first by governance and then by abnormal accruals (AA), or first by AA and then by governance, give 
basically the same qualitative results. I also conduct sorts based on the most extreme governance and AA i.e. firms with G-
Index score of 5 and below (14 and above) are classified as Democracy (Dictatorship), while firms with AA Score of 1 (10) 
are classified as Low AA (High AA), and it also does not significantly affect qualitatively the results. I stick with the extended 
sample classification of Democracy firms as having a G-Index score of 7 and Low AA (High AA) firms as having an AA 
Score of 3 and below (8 and above) since the portfolio returns of these groups are economically similar in magnitude in the 
original GIM (2003) and Sloan (1996), and it ensures that there is a reasonable number of firms in each of the two-
dimensional sorted portfolios to increases the degrees of freedom so as to yield a more reliable statistical interpretation of the 
results. I also argue that there is a heightened increase in attention on corporate governance and the abnormal accruals signal, 
especially after the post-GIM and post-Sloan-TAR period, and investors will inevitably cast their resources in analyzing 
near-Democracy-Dictatorship and slightly-less-extreme AA firms. Importantly, as one of my key tests is to examine whether 
isolating Democracy-Low AA firms will enhance significantly the governance effects on returns (H1b), such a sorting and re-
classification is biased against my findings. 
24 
 
In Panel A of Table 2 which describes the data for the overall sample period from September 
1, 1991 to December 31, 2008, the monthly alpha for the unconditional Democracy portfolio is 
positive at 0.289 percent, albeit statistically insignificant. For the sub-period September 1, 1991 to 
December 31, 1999 in Panel B of Table 2, which is the original sample period in GIM (2003), the 
monthly alpha is positive at 0.212 percent, which is quite close in economic significance to the 0.29 
percent for the original and smaller Democracy portfolio in GIM (2003), although it is statistically 
insignificant. Recall that as per the description in Section 3, I have extended the sample size of the 
Democracy portfolio which now comprises 27.9 percent of the sample on average, as compared to the 
original 9 percent in GIM (2003). The unconditional Low AA portfolio has significant positive 
abnormal future return at 6.4 percent per year (t-statistics of 2.60) over 1991-2008 and 6.6 percent (t-
statistics of 2.16) in the sub-period 1991-1999, although the positive return is no longer significant in 
the sub-period 2000-2008, which is consistent with Sloan (1996) and also with the recent findings in 
Green et al (2008) that the returns to the abnormal accruals portfolio are dissipating due to hedge 
funds overcrowding the trades in exploiting this signal. 
The portfolio of Democracy firms with Low AA, dubbed Super-Performers, generates a 
positive monthly alpha of 0.875 percent (t-statistics of 2.73), or abnormal return of 10.5 percent per 
year from 1991 to 2008. Thus, the null in H1b can be rejected. The 10.5 percent abnormal return for 
this Super-Performers or Democracy-Low AA portfolio is far larger than the return for the 
unconditional Democracy portfolio (3.5 percent). It can be inferred that the incremental value in the 
Low AA signal is 7.0 percent per year. Notice also how the 10.5 percent abnormal return for this 
Democracy-Low AA portfolio is higher than the return for the unconditional Low AA portfolio (6.6 
percent); thus, the incremental value in the good governance signal is 3.9 percent. These results lend 
further weight to my conjecture that corporate governance and abnormal acccruals are inexorably 
linked through a complementarity relationship; the null in H1c can be rejected. The abnormal return 
of these Super-Performers are also economically larger (700 basis points per year) than the long 
position documented in GIM (2003), and is also 200 basis points more than the entire hedge returns in 
GIM (2003). Interestingly, a closer investigation indicate that some of these Super-Performers include 
well-known, institutional big-cap stocks, such as Coca-Cola Co, AT&T, Hewlett-Packard, Wyeth, 
Lowe‟s, Home Depot, and EMC, formed in the portfolio at various months in the sample period.  
In addition, I find evidence that removing these Super-Performers will reduce the remaining 
Democracy portfolio returns to no different from zero statistically over the period of 1991-2008, and 
over the sub-period of 1991-1999 that was examined in GIM (2003) (H1a). In other words, good 
governance per se no longer pays off, contrary to the findings in GIM (2003). Therefore, the null in 
H1a can be rejected. 
Mixed governance firms, with a G-Index between 8 and 11, comprise 52.1 percent of the 
sample on average, and they are termed Drifter. GIM (2003) and all the subsequent literature on 
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governance made no mention about these Drifter firms even though they are the bulk of the sample 
size. The unconditional monthly alpha for Drifter portfolio is negative on average in 1991-2008 and 
in the two sub-periods (1991-1999 and 2000-2008). Interestingly, I find that the portfolio of Drifter 
with Low AA has significantly positive monthly alpha of 0.520 percent (t-statistics of 2.22), or 
abnormal return of 6.2 percent per year over 1991-2008; the returns are even greater during the sub-
period 1991-1999 at 9.2 percent per year (t-statistics of 2.82). Thus, it is not only good governance 
firms that enjoy positive future abnormal return; Drifter with Low AA can revel in this capital 
appreciation outperformance as well. The factor loading for SMB is significantly positive, indicating 
that the stocks in this particular Drifter-High EQ portfolio tend to be smaller stocks, although this no 
longer holds true in the sub-period 1991-99. During the sub-period of 2000-2008, the monthly alpha 
for the Drifter-High EQ portfolio dropped to an insignificant 0.325 percent. Surprisingly, even 
Dictatorship with Low AA can have positive abnormal return at 2.4 percent per year over 1991-2008, 
albeit statistically insignificant, as compared to 0.2 percent per year for the unconditional Dictatorship 
portfolio. The null in H1d can thus be rejected. 
For the unconditional High AA portfolio, the abnormal future returns is negative 2.2 percent 
per year over 1991-2008, as expected under Sloan (1996), albeit statistically insignificant. Democracy 
with High AA have positive, albeit insignificant, annualized abnormal return of 3.2 percent, which 
lends some support for the null rejection in H2a. Unsurprisingly, High AA firms accompanied by 
Dictatorship and Drifter governance structures have negative abnormal annualized returns of 0.9 and 
7.5 percent (t-statistics of -2.90) respectively, which are as predicted by Sloan (1996); thus, the null in 
H2b can be rejected, particularly for the Drifter-High AA portfolio. Interestingly, the excess 
performance for the Drifter-High AA portfolio is larger (by 200 basis points per year) than the returns 
from the short position (5.5 percent per year) documented in Sloan (1996). The factor loading SMB 
for the Drifter-High AA firms is significantly positive, indicating that the stocks in this portfolio tend 
to be smaller stocks. 
The small negative insignificant returns for the short position of the Dictatorship-High AA 
portfolio may seem, at first blush, surprising since it is the worst of both worlds. However, this is 
consistent with the findings in Core et al (2006) who find that weak governance firms have poorer 
operating performance, but investors and analysts continue to forecast this difference and hence are 
not systematically surprised to the extent that leads to stock price declines. The results are also 
consistent with Bowen, Rajgopal and Venkatachalam (2008) who find that managers do not 
systematically exploit poor governance structures to engage in accounting discretionary at the 
shareholders‟ expense since subsequent future operating performance is positive. A caveat is that 
stock returns as a yardstick of performance measurement is a “noisy” measure, since bad governance 
can impose substantial ongoing costs on shareholders with no return effect so long as shareholders are 
not surprised by the costs. 
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In the additional test for the Negative ACCREV portfolio of stocks with revelation of high or 
extreme income-increasing accruals in period t which experiences the greatest magnitude in accruals 
reversal in period t+1, the results in Table 3 indicate positive annualized abnormal future returns of 
10.8 percent (t-statistics of 1.98) per year for those are also Democracy firms, contrary to the 
expectation of negative future returns in Sloan (1996) 18. Delving deeper into this Negative ACCREV-
Democracy portfolio, I find that 43 percent of the sample are Democracy-High AA in the previous 
period. This means that not all the firms with extreme high abnormal accruals in period t reverse 
sharply in period t+1. For this specific group (N = 2785), the future positive abnormal returns is even 
larger at 20.3 percent per year over 1991-2008 (t-statistics of 3.18)19! Again, this is not the negative 
return that was expected under Sloan‟s hypothesis. On one hand, negative accruals reversal may 
imply aggressive accounting, such as managers opportunistically boosting inventory accruals in 
period t and subsequently being forced to write down inventory in period t+1 when demand falls short. 
On the other hand, as the cash consequences that the accruals anticipate are realized when the accruals 
reverse, the trend of reported earnings and the subsequent accruals reversals at these negative accruals 
reversal firms who have at the same time good governance structures are interpreted as credible 
private signals of firm performance by the managers, resulting in larger positive future stock return. 
This can be explain by how earnings trend consistency is valued at a premium by the market (Barth, 
Elliott, and Finn, 1999), as is consistency in benchmark performance (Bartov et al, 2002; Kasznik and 
McNichols, 2002). Thus, the null in H3 can be rejected.  
It may be argued that if there is incremental value in the good governance signal, then there 
should be positive abnormal future return for the Positive ACCREV-Democracy portfolio as well, or 
those firms who have low or extreme income-decreasing accruals in period t which experiences large 
accruals reversal to high accruals in period t+1. I find some evidence that this holds true, particularly 
in the sub-period 1991-1999 where the Positive ACCREV-Democracy portfolio generates positive 
abnormal future return of 9.7 percent per year, although the magnitude is greatly reduced to 2.4 
percent for the overall sample period 1991-2008 and is also no longer significant. The factor loadings 
for SMB and HML are significantly positive and negative respectively, indicating that the stocks in 
this particular portfolio tend to be smaller and “growth” stocks. 
Overall, the empirical results from testing the three hypotheses highlight the joint importance 
of governance and abnormal accruals in contributing to the total information environment to separate 
winners from losers.  
                                                          
18 In a further robustness check, defining ACCREVt+1 as the change in abnormal accruals (measured as the residual in 
Dechow and Dichev (2002) model) from period t to period t+1 does not change my results; the abnormal returns remain at 
10.7 percent per year but more significant (t-statistics 2.58), thus, I report the more conservative results.  
19 The remaining 57 percent of the sample have a positive monthly alpha of 0.569 percent, or 6.8 percent per year, although 
no longer significant. 
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Repeating the analysis using the modified Jones model by Dechow et al (1996) to estimate the 
abnormal accruals, all the results as shown in Table 4 and 5 are qualitatively similar, although the 
statistical significance is lost for most of the findings for the overall sample period from 1991-2008. A 
closer investigation highlights that the results hold true in the original sub-period 1991-1999 in GIM 
(2003), but the significance has mainly dissipated in the post-GIM sub-period 2000-2008. This is 
consistent with the findings in Bebchuk et al (2010) and Green et al (2008) that the governance effect 
on performance and the return to the abnormal accruals strategy had largely disappeared in the 2000s 
due to “learning” by the market participants or hedge funds deploying excess capital to exploit the 
signals.  Green et al (2009) further argued that the abnormal accruals trading strategy documented by 
Sloan (1996) was known to a few in academe but to no practitioners in the pre-Sloan sub-period 4/89-
12/95. This pre-Sloan period also coincided with my findings that the AA signal provides incremental 
value during the sub-period 1991-1999. However, the accruals anomaly took some time to be 
understood for investors to take definite action (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Lee, 2001; Mitchell, 
Pedersen, and Pulvino, 2007). In the post-Sloan-TAR period, Green et al (2008) pointed out that not 
only was the accruals anomaly widely known both inside and outside of academe, but during the 
period, key senior accounting academics such as Charles Lee and Richard Sloan significantly 
increased their ties to Barclays Global Investors.  
There is also heightened attention by the SEC, the media, and the public in earnings quality 
issue in the 2000s, particularly after the various accounting scandals epitomized by the Enron case, 
and increased regulatory scrutiny such as the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, or Sarbox (2002), 
and Regulation Fair Disclosure, or RegFD (1999-2000), and higher incidence of litigation risks 
associated with abnormal accruals (DuCharme et al, 2004) during this period. These factors could 
probably account for “lower” opportunistic manipulation of accruals in which the “discretionary” 
portion could be estimated using the now widely-known modified Jones model (Cohen, Dey, and Lys, 
2008; Bartov and Cohen, 2009), resulting in a weaker trading signal, and hence the decaying return 
and lack of statistical significance for my sub-period 2000-2008 from the modified Jones model.   
4.3 Firm characteristics and firm operating performance in the two-dimensional portfolios  
 In this section, I explore the return on the two-dimensional portfolios in greater depth by 
examining their firm characteristics. In Table 6, I make comparisons between five pairs of portfolios: 
(1) Democracy-Low AA (Super-Performers) Vs. Democracy-High AA portfolios, so as to attempt to 
find out the source of the incremental value in the AA signal in the firm characteristics; (2) 
Democracy-Low AA (Super-Performers) Vs. Dictatorship-Low AA to assess the incremental value in 
the governance signal; (3) Drifter-Low AA Vs. Drifter-High AA, so as to assess what are so different 
in the firm-characteristics between these two sets of firms beyond the Fama-French-Carhart factors, 
given that the results that the hedge abnormal return can be economically substantial at 13.7 percent 
per year; (4) Democracy-High AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA, since firms with high abnormal accruals 
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– conventionally interpreted as poor earnings quality – are expected to be associated with negative 
future return, but Democracy-High AA firms can instead have positive return – could there be any 
systematic similarities or differences in firm-characteristics that explain this; and finally (5) 
Dictatorship-Low AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA, since it is surely an oddity for firms with poor 
governance structures to be associated with positive return if they are also accompanied by Low AA, 
and investigating the firm-characteristics could perhaps prove fruitful in re-looking into possible 
instances of “good” managerial entrenchment. 
First, in the comparison between firms in Democracy-Low AA (Super-Performers) and 
Democracy-High AA in Table 6, Super-Performers are relatively smaller in size with median (mean) 
market cap at $630 million ($3.7 billion) versus $903 million ($4.7 billion) for Democracy-High AA 
firms. Also, Super-Performers have relatively lower share price, lower turnover, higher book-to-
market ratio, relatively similar PE ratio, higher dividend yield, lower sales growth, lower ROA, 
slightly more leverage, lower R&D and capex, higher deferred revenue, and larger negative special 
items. There is no difference in operating performance in the previous year, while there is an 
improvement (deterioration) in ROA in the following year for Super-Performers (Democracy-Low 
AA). Second, as compared to Dictatorship-Low AA, Super-Performers are similar in size, have lower 
share price, higher turnover, slightly higher book-to-market ratio, lower PE, lower dividend yield, 
quite similar sales growth, lower ROA, lower leverage, higher R&D and capex, and higher deferred 
revenue. There is a slightly lower operating performance in the previous year for Democracy-Low AA, 
while there is an improvement in ROA in the following year for both. Interestingly, higher capex 
investments in the hands of the managers at these Super-Performers do not lead to poor stock return 
as was suggested by Titman et al (2004).  
The results appear to suggest that Super-Performers could be “turnaround-stocks” as they 
have larger negative special items (such as a one-time non-cash restructuring write-off) and better 
subsequent operating performance. Thus, their outsized performance could be due to investors failing 
to understand the transitory nature of negative non-cash special items, pronouncing the return from 
the low accruals anomaly, according to the arguments in Dechow and Ge (2006). In the discussion of 
the paper by Dechow and Ge, Fairfield (2006) noted that “the evidence raise questions about the 
source of the improved accounting performance ... return on assets for the low accrual/negative 
special items firms may increase for various reason - the lower asset base from the write-off, the 
absence of negative special items in the following year, or higher „core earnings‟ in the following year. 
Because Dechow and Ge do not control for the effect of the denominator and do not separate future 
earnings into its core and special components, the evidence does not demonstrate conclusively that the 
firms recover in any meaningful sense … poorly performing firms and negative accrual firms are not 
identical sets, but the authors did not differentiate between the two.”  
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As mentioned earlier, Super-Performers include well-known, institutional big-cap stocks, 
such as Coca-Cola Co, formed in the portfolio at various months in 1991-2008. Using Coca-Cola as 
an example20, I find that the excess returns are mainly from the 1990-1991, 1994-1997 and 2006 
period. Roberto Goizueta took over the reins of the CEO in 1985 and Coca-Cola embarked upon one 
of the most famous marketing blunders in corporate America history by launching the sweeter “New 
Coke” to compete with Pepsi for the “younger” taste buds. “New Coke” was booed with negative 
publicity and prompted the reversal back to “Classic Coke”. Coca-Cola sold the non-core 
entertainment business Columbia Pictures, purchased by Goizueta in 1982, to Sony for $3 billion in 
1989. After the restructurings, the company emerge stronger from its earlier blunders and re-
established itself as the pacesetter in the non-alcoholic beverage industry during the 1990s21.  
In 1990, the company opened the “World of Coca Cola” museum in Atlanta to retell its 
heritage; excess returns were generated in 1990-1991. 1993 saw the introduction of the popular 
“Always Coca-Cola” advertising campaign, and the world met with the lovable Coca-Cola Polar Bear 
for the first time.  Coca-Cola also became a major sponsor of the Olympics and enjoyed a high profile 
during the 1996 Olympic Games. By 1997, 1 billion Coca-Cola products were sold every day – and 
1997 was also the year of death of its iconic CEO Goizueta; excess returns were generated in 1994-
1997. One of Goizueta‟s notable accomplishments was to help Coca-Cola realize the goal to develop 
a diet version of Coke in 1982; 2005 saw the déjà-vu launch of Coke Zero, the popular zero calorie 
cola - excess returns were generated in 2006.  
And all these corporate actions took place in a Democracy governance structure at Coca-Cola, 
suggesting that corporate governance could be the important joint factor that Fairfield (2006) 
questioned about to determine whether the low accrual firms with negative special items “recover in 
any meaningful sense”.  As pointed out in the empirical results in Section 4.2, the 10.5 percent 
abnormal return per year over 1991-2008 for Super-Performers (low accruals firms with good 
governance) is higher than the return for the unconditional low accruals portfolio (6.6 percent), 
indicating that the incremental value in the good governance signal is 3.9 percent, and that the 
complementarity in governance and accruals information is important in determining returns 
predictability and the persistence in longer-term firm performance.   
Third, Drifter-Low AA are slightly bigger in size than Drifter-High AA, have quite similar 
share price, slightly higher turnover, slightly higher book-to-market, quite similar PE ratio, slightly 
higher dividend yield, lower sales growth, lower ROA, quite similar leverage, quite similar R&D, 
lower capex, higher deferred revenue, and larger negative special items. There is a slightly lower 
                                                          
20 See http://heritage.coca-cola.com/ for a heritage timeline of Coca-Cola.  
21 Interestingly, billionaire investor Warren Buffett purchased 7 percent of Coca-Cola for $1 billion for his listed investment 
holding company Berkshire Hathaway in 1988, and added 1.2 percent along the way at $0.3 billion, seemingly 
demonstrating the sophistication to exploit the joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals to generate outsized 
returns. Of course, he remains a rare exception - and also an inspiration that the results in this paper could be implementable. 
Buffett‟s $1.3 billion investment cost in Coca-Cola has since grown nearly 10-folds to around $11 billion.  
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operating performance in the previous year for Drifter-Low AA, while there is an improvement 
(deterioration) in ROA in the following year for Drifter-Low AA (Drifter-High AA). The 
“restructuring effect” is probably at work again for the positive abnormal return at Drifter-Low AA 
who have large negative special items. Interestingly, it also further reinforces the importance of 
governance quality in determining the persistence in longer-term firm performance since Super-
Performers (low accruals firms with good governance) generate 4.3 percent per year more in 
abnormal return over 1991-2008 than Drifter with similarly negative accruals and negative special 
items. 
Fourth, Democracy-High AA are smaller in size than Dictatorship-High AA, have lower share 
price, higher turnover, quite similar book-to-market ratio, higher PE ratio, lower dividend yield, 
higher sales growth, higher ROA, lower leverage, higher R&D and capex, higher deferred revenue, 
and quite similar negative special items. There is a mixed operating performance in the previous year 
for Democracy-Low AA, while there is deterioration in ROA in the following year for both. The 
results appear to suggest that booking higher sales growth and larger corporate investments (capex 
and R&D) are regarded as a genuine attempt by the managers to increase shareholders‟ wealth even if 
it increases abnormal accruals and impacts short-term operating performance (lower ROA in the 
following year) at the Democracy-High AA firms, and hence their future return is not negative 
(although not significantly positive) as predicted under Sloan.  
Fifth, Dictatorship-Low AA are smaller in size than Dictatorship-High AA, have lower share 
price, slightly lower turnover, higher book-to-market ratio, higher PE ratio, higher dividend yield, 
lower sales growth, lower ROA, higher leverage, slightly higher R&D, slightly lower capex, higher 
deferred revenue, and larger negative special items. There is a slightly lower operating performance in 
the previous year for Dictatorship-Low AA, while there is an improvement (deterioration) in ROA in 
the following year for Dictatorship-Low AA (Dictatorship-High AA). This appears to suggest that the 
supposed “entrenched” managers at Dictatorship-Low AA are probably achievers who want a “quiet 
life” and they produce higher future operating performance and pay a higher dividend yield to 
shareholders. This is different from the results in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2003) that show 
profitability declined in the firms run by “quiet-life” entrenched managers. The reason is likely 
because the incremental value in the AA signal helps in separating the quiet-performing managers 
from the “quietly” destructive entrenched managers who produce discordantly poor future operating 
performance. 
5.  Robustness Test 
Kraft, Leone, and Wasley (2006) document a “look-ahead bias” in many accruals studies. 
Because many studies using the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model were interested in examining the 
evolution of accruals as well as the stock returns to an accruals-based trading strategy, the sample 
selection required that the next year‟s cash flow from operations be present. But whether or not the 
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numbers are present in the next year is not known at the time of portfolio formation, so the 
documented return is not the result of an implementable trading strategy. Kraft et al (2006) show in a 
sample of NYSE/AMEX firms that the return to the low accrual portfolio is 4.2 percent with the bias 
present but only 1.8 percent without it. 
I investigate further this “look-ahead bias” by removing the term CFOt+1 in equation (2) and 
running the modified regression model which comprise of only historical accounting data known at 
the portfolio formation date. In Table 7 and 8, I find that all of my results are strikingly very similar, 
although the magnitude of the abnormal return to the Super-Performers is reduced to 6.5 percent per 
year (t-statistics 1.92) for 1991-2008 as compared to 10.5 percent in the original model. The abnormal 
return to the unconditional Low AA portfolio is reduced slightly to 5.7 percent per year (t-statistics 
2.24) from 6.4 percent. The Drifter-Low AA portfolio has a slight increase in abnormal return to 6.6 
per cent per year (t-statistics 1.84) from 6.2 percent, although the significance is lowered. In addition, 
the abnormal return to the Drifter-High AA portfolio is negative at 3.0 percent per year, as compared 
to minus 7.5 percent in the original model, and is no longer significant. The positive abnormal return 
to the Negative ACCREV-Democracy portfolio is reduced slightly to 9.4 percent per year (t-statistics 
2.09) for 1991-2008 as compared to 10.8 percent. In short, the trading strategy still remains viable 
economically and statistically.  
Interestingly, the results also reinforced the importance of the prospective cash flow from 
operations information, since its inclusion into the regression model to estimate abnormal accruals 
greatly enhance the magnitude of the future abnormal return. Dechow, Richardson and Sloan (2008) 
conjectured it is the use of cash, rather than the raising or the distribution of financing, that leads to 
predictable returns. Information of next-period‟s cash flow from operations can reveal much about the 
use of cash, and market participants can assess whether managers have been credible in what they 
have communicated in the previous period(s) on how they intend to utilize cash in investment projects, 
and my results in this robustness test support the argument in Dechow et al (2008). 
5.  Summary and Conclusion 
The signals of corporate governance and abnormal accruals are akin to the bow and arrow in a 
complementarity relationship, resolving the uncertainty associated with what each signal can reveal 
on a stand-alone basis about firm performance and its future prospects, as well as aiding in the 
understanding of whether managers exercise accounting discretion in an opportunistic or efficient 
manner. The bow (governance signal) without the arrow (abnormal accruals signal) is not effective; 
the governance effect on returns is attenuated to no different from zero when the firms with both good 
governance and low abnormal accruals (AA) are removed. Similarly, the arrow without the bow 
cannot shoot far and sharply to yield outsized abnormal future return; Super-Performers, the firms 
with both good governance and Low AA, can generate abnormal return of 10.5 percent per year over 
1991-2008, as compared to the 3.5 and 6.4 percent for the unconditional good governance and Low 
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AA firms respectively, illuminating the incremental value in what each signal can bring to each other. 
Together, the unique pairing of the “arrow” and the “bow” contributes to the total information 
environment to separate winners from losers.    
The orthodox view since Sloan (1996) that high accruals is associated with negative future 
stock return has resulted in high accruals to be widely interpreted as evidence of earnings 
management or poor earnings quality. The Icarus manager, exalted by his flight when flying the pair 
of flexible accruals wax wings based upon the revenue recognition and matching principles, was 
flying too high to the nearness of the blazing sun, which softened the wax that held the feathers 
together. Daedalus cried out to his son that the wings were built for a higher purpose than his self-
satisfaction; Icarus ignored the teachings of his father and flew higher, thinking his wings made him 
the equal of the Gods. The pair of wings came off, and Icarus plunged into the sea; akin to extreme 
accruals reversal and the “consequent” negative future stock return. Thus, the Icarus-managers‟ 
accounting accruals discretion need to be curbed, since investors cannot unravel the valuation effect 
of reported earnings in a timely manner under current reporting standards.  
Such a dominant view has not been questioned before (Christie and Zimmerman, 1996; Louis 
and Robinson, 2005; Bowen et al, 2008), although uncommon. Most forgot that it was Icarus, 
Daedalus‟ son, who sank, not Daedalus himself. Daedalus escaped the labyrinth of King Midas and 
was the only mortal to fly without divine assistance. Healy and Whalen (1999) believe in the 
importance in identifying and explaining “which types of accruals are used for earnings management 
and which are not”. My results raise doubts that investors respond in the same manner to abnormal 
accruals, since Democracy firms with high or extreme income-increasing AA have positive future 
return. This suggests two things: one, the level of abnormal accruals is a coarse measure of earnings 
manipulation for these set of firms, although it appears to remain a reasonable proxy of earnings 
management or earnings quality for firms with mixed or poor governance structures; and two, 
shareholders benefit from “earnings management” because the high accruals signals future 
performance (e.g. Subramanyam, 1996; Chaney et al, 1996). The evidence helps in the understanding 
of investor behavior and whether the policy recommendations in Richardson, Sloan, Soliman, and 
Tuna (2005, 2006) and FASB to curtail the use of “less reliable” components of accruals are 
appropriate, especially for Democracy firms. If the joint interactive signal of governance and 
abnormal accruals can be a more informative measure of firm performance, reforms to limit 
managerial flexibility may be counterproductive and an “Icarus paradox”.  
This study is also the first, to the best of my knowledge, to investigate the properties of the 
mixed governance (Drifter) firms, the group of firms unexamined in prior literature even though it 
forms the bulk of the sample size. I document that Drifter can have abnormal future returns as well – 
if the AA signal is combined interactively with the Drifter signal: the excess return at Drifter-Low AA 
is 6.2 per year over 1991-2008 while that at Drifter-High AA is negative 7.5 percent per year. In 
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addition, the results restore economic viability to the long position of both the governance and 
abnormal accruals trading strategy, which can be important given short-selling constraints in the short 
position. My paper also contribute to the resolution of the highly debated issue in the governance 
literature by showing how both the supporters and critics of the governance effects on returns in GIM 
(2003) are not incorrect when the governance signal is interactively combined with the abnormal 
accruals information to yield unique information about the future prospects of the firm.  
The explicit use of accounting information in contracts between management and financiers 
represents probably the most visible use of accounting information in governance mechanisms (Sloan, 
2001). The results in my paper suggest that the design of managerial compensation requires obtaining 
performance measures that do not rely solely on earnings. Financiers require the firm to have a 
governance structure that will elicit the managers‟ private information credibly. It is rare to observe in 
practice the use of both earnings and governance measures in contracting. Thus, my results suggest 
that the inclusion of both measures could result in more efficient contracting.   
Finally, this paper highlights the salient fact that it is difficult to apply any one single measure, 
such as governance or abnormal accruals, on a stand-alone basis to assess firm value and performance, 
as not only are they one of a multitude of pieces of information of possible interest about firms‟ 
quality, but they also interact with one another to resolve informational uncertainty about what each 
signal can reveal on its own. An investor considers a wide array of contextual information to 
continually rebalance his or her portfolio (Amir and Lev, 1996; Shevlin, 1996; Beneish, Lee, and 
Tarpley, 2001; Sloan, 2001; Sorensen, Hua, and Qian, 2005). Interestingly, my paper underscores the 
value of skillful fundamental analysis in moving away from generic strategies by combining different 
contextual information - governance information in this study - and looking through this lens to reach 
fresh insights in equity valuation. This is especially pertinent in a trading environment where large 
quantitative-oriented hedge funds pursue similar strategy resulting in correlated performance and 
destructive destabilizing price impact in deleveraging situations (Khandani and Lo, 2008; Boyson, 
Stahel and Stulz, 2008; Stein, 2009). Corporate governance is not just about complying with rules or 
reporting requirements. Rather it is about internalizing the values, spirit, and purpose behind the rules 
and is also integral in a company‟s strategy in creating (or destroying) shareholders‟ value. Thus, a 
sober consideration of the joint importance of governance and abnormal accruals information to 
separate winners and losers is also in the spirit of Sloan‟s sagacious advice in the CFA Digest 1/2010: 
“I believe that using good fundamental analysis to detect accounting distortions by understanding the 
accounting and the company‟s strategy and how they fit together will always be an incredibly 
important source of value-added for the investment management community”. 
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Table 1: Comparison of firm characteristics for 1991 to 2008 
Table 1 report the firm characteristics of the three categories of portfolio sorted by (a) abnormal accruals (Panel A) and (b) 
governance quality (Panel B). G-Index is the governance score from IRRC/Risk Metrics. Abnormal Accrual is calculated 
from the residual in Dechow and Dichev (2002) model. The magnitude of the abnormal accrual is sorted into 10-decile 
portfolios and firms with the lowest (highest) abnormal accrual have an AA Score of 1 (10). Market cap (in millions) is 
calculated monthly as shares outstanding times the month-end share price. Turnover is the monthly number of shares traded 
relative to the number of shares outstanding. BM or book-to-market is the book value equity per share relative to the month-
end share price. PE or price-earnings ratio is end-of-fiscal-year share price relative to EPS. Div or dividend yield is dividend 
per share relative to share price. ROA or return on assets is income before extraordinary items relative to average total assets. 
Leverage is total net debt relative to total assets. R&D is research and expenditure expense relative to sales. Capex1 is capital 
expenditure relative to sales. Capex2 is capital expenditure relative to average total assets. Deferred Revenue is deferred 
current revenue (Compustat item DRC) relative to average total assets. Special Item is special items relative to average total 
assets. N is the number of firm-months. Means tests are based on time-series of monthly cross-sectional means. 
 
Panel A: Firms sorted by abnormal accruals 
 Low AA 
(N = 24139) 
High AA 
(N = 21412) 
Means t-
test 
Mixed EQ 
(N = 41936 ) 
 Mean Median Mean Median p-value Mean Median 
G-Index 8.8 9.0 8.8 9.0 0.897 9.1 9.0 
Abnormal Accrual -0.031 -0.022 0.029 0.022 < .01 0.000 -0.000 
Market cap 4087.811 835.380 4522.744 963.255 < .01 5061.764 1393.431 
Price 26.012 21.750 28.171 23.938 < .01 31.160 27.813 
Turnover 1.567 1.022 1.609 0.990 < .01 1.258 0.786 
BM 0.580 0.451 0.512 0.411 < .01 0.560 0.484 
PE  17.354 16.618 18.179 16.252 0.535 20.603 16.046 
Div 0.016 0.000 0.012 0.002 < .01 0.024 0.013 
Sales Growth 0.070 0.047 0.172 0.109 < .01 0.105 0.074 
ROAt-1 0.023 0.041 0.030 0.054 < .01 0.038 0.043 
ROAt 0.011 0.033 0.061 0.069 < .01 0.045 0.046 
ROAt+1 0.037 0.048 0.049 0.060 < .01 0.048 0.048 
Leverage 0.113 0.118 0.105 0.118 < .01 0.216 0.242 
R&D 0.191 0.068 0.290 0.010 < .01 1.164 0.000 
Capex1 0.073 0.038 0.095 0.045 < .01 0.131 0.051 
Capex2 0.055 0.041 0.066 0.051 < .01 0.064 0.051 
Deferred Revenue 0.010 0.000 0.058 0.000 < .01 0.005 0.000 
Special Item -0.023 -0.001 -0.011 0.000 < .01 -0.009 0.000 
 
Panel B: Firms sorted by governance quality 
 Democracy 
(N = 26677) 
Dictatorship 
(N = 15706) 
Means t-
test 
Drifter 
(N = 45134) 
 Mean Median Mean Median p-value Mean Median 
G-Index 5.8 6.0 12.9 13.0 < .01 9.5 9.0 
Abnormal Accrual -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 < .01 -0.001 -0.000 
AA Score 5.3 5.0 5.4 5.0 < .01 5.4 5.0 
Market cap 4592.904 918.294 5024.484 1622.911 < .01 4575.248 1141.564 
Price 26.733 23.188 32.698 29.130 < .01 29.070 25.420 
Turnover 1.521 0.881 1.090 0.766 < .01 1.492 0.955 
BM 0.560 0.448 0.533 0.468 < .01 0.557 0.460 
PE  23.093 16.300 16.843 16.208 < .01 17.537 16.155 
Div 0.016 0.000 0.028 0.018 < .01 0.017 0.058 
Sales Growth 0.131 0.088 0.087 0.063 < .01 0.108 0.073 
ROAt-1 0.035 0.048 0.042 0.045 < .01 0.027 0.044 
ROAt 0.045 0.050 0.045 0.047 0.737 0.034 0.047 
ROAt+1 0.050 0.052 0.051 0.051 0.516 0.040 0.049 
Leverage 0.126 0.115 0.210 0.228 < .01 0.163 0.186 
R&D 0.183 0.000 0.035 0.003 < .01 1.201 0.000 
Capex1 0.096 0.047 0.057 0.040 < .01 0.129 0.047 
Capex2 0.065 0.049 0.053 0.046 < .01 0.063 0.048 
Deferred Revenue 0.008 0.000 0.002 0.000 < .01 0.007 0.000 
Special Item -0.012 0.000 -0.012 0.000 0.472 -0.014 0.000 
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Table 2: Monthly alphas of portfolios sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002) 
Table 2 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in 
the portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model). Stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 
2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I 
extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively 
similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. 
Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on average as compared to the original 9 percent. 
Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0 
percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The remaining mixed governance firms, termed 
Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, 
ten decile portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three 
months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms 
with the lowest (highest) value in residuals is given an AA score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms 
into the three categories of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or 
Income-Decreasing Abnormal Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, 
those with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. Panel A describes the overall sample 
period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as 
in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008. All standard errors are 
White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.875*** 
(2.73) 
-0.079 
(-0.28) 
0.268 
(0.86) 
0.289 
(1.42) 
Drifter 0.520** 
(2.22) 
0.012 
(0.07) 
-0.626*** 
(-2.90) 
-0.068 
(-0.58) 
Dictatorship 0.197 
(0.79) 
-0.075 
(-0.38) 
-0.076 
(-0.26) 
0.019 
(0.12) 
Overall 0.535*** 
(2.60) 
-0.034 
(-0.24) 
-0.187 
(-1.03) 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.579 
(1.35) 
-0.058 
(-0.18) 
0.559 
(1.52) 
0.212 
(0.94) 
Drifter 0.765*** 
(2.82) 
-0.028 
(-0.17) 
-0.686*** 
(-2.68) 
-0.015 
(-0.12) 
Dictatorship 0.050 
(0.18) 
-0.015 
(-0.06) 
-0.161 
(-0.55) 
0.013 
(0.07) 
Overall 0.546** 
(2.16) 
-0.052 
(-0.42) 
-0.025 
(-0.13) 
 
 
Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.814* 
(1.84) 
0.259 
(0.66) 
-0.144 
(-0.32) 
0.399 
(1.31) 
Drifter 0.325 
(0.87) 
0.123 
(0.43) 
-0.533 
(-1.51) 
-0.017 
(-0.09) 
Dictatorship 0.042 
(0.11) 
0.027 
(0.09) 
0.241 
(0.57) 
0.084 
(0.34) 
Overall 0.412 
(1.31) 
0.143 
(0.62) 
-0.314 
(-1.10) 
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Table 3: Accruals reversal (Dechow and Dichev, 2002) and future stock returns  
Table 3 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are 
sorted two-dimensionally by governance and accruals reversal ACCREVt+1 (measured as the difference between accruals in 
the current period and accruals in the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as ∆WC in equation (2) in Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model) that were described in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, 
July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months 
when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM 
(2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as 
firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on 
average as compared to the original 9 percent. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship 
(bad governance), now comprising 20.0 percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the 
sample on average. The magnitude of ACCREVt+1 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the 
end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the 
monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREVt+1 is given an 
accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals 
reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed 
Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive 
Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the 
sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy 0.197 
(0.57) 
0.050 
(0.24) 
0.897** 
(1.98) 
0.289 
(1.42) 
Drifter -0.198 
(-0.84) 
-0.006 
(-0.04) 
-0.060 
(-0.24) 
-0.068 
(-0.58) 
Dictatorship 0.106 
(0.38) 
0.033 
(0.19) 
-0.026 
(-0.09) 
0.019 
(0.09) 
Overall 0.110 
(0.51) 
-0.051 
(-0.04) 
0.153 
(0.68) 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy 0.807** 
(2.30) 
0.007 
(0.02) 
0.515 
(1.13) 
0.212 
(0.94) 
Drifter -0.367 
(-1.38) 
0.126 
(0.93) 
-0.046 
(-0.16) 
-0.015 
(-0.12) 
Dictatorship -0.150 
(-0.34) 
0.099 
(0.45 
0.201 
(0.56) 
0.189 
(0.12) 
Overall 0.247 
(1.30) 
0.069 
(0.57) 
0.028 
(0.12) 
 
 
Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy -0.059 
(-0.11) 
-0.099 
(-0.34) 
1.344** 
(1.98) 
0.399 
(1.31) 
Drifter 0.021 
(0.06) 
-0.038 
(-0.16) 
0.102 
(0.27) 
-0.017 
(-0.09) 
Dictatorship 0.396 
(1.09) 
0.102 
(0.38) 
-0.095 
(-0.22) 
0.013 
(0.07) 
Overall 0.061 
(0.18) 
-0.052 
(-0.26) 
0.384 
(1.09) 
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Table 4: Monthly alphas of portfolios sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (Dechow et al, 
1996) 
Table 4 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in 
the portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by Dechow et al (1996) 
model). Stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, 
February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I extended 
the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar 
positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, 
Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on average as compared to the original 9 percent. Similarly, I re-
classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0 percent of the 
sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a 
G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, ten decile 
portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three months after 
the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms with the 
lowest (highest) value in residuals is given an AA score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms into the 
three categories of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or Income-
Decreasing Abnormal Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, those 
with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. Panel A describes the overall sample period 
from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in 
GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008. All standard errors are 
White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.391 
(1.55) 
0.149 
(0.93) 
-0.054 
(-0.24) 
0.139 
(1.11) 
Drifter 0.274 
(1.35) 
0.183 
(1.41) 
-0.215 
(-1.21) 
0.090 
(0.92) 
Dictatorship 0.328 
(1.55) 
0.079 
(0.65) 
0.191 
(0.91) 
0.117 
(1.13) 
Overall 0.318** 
(2.08) 
0.142 
(1.38) 
-0.065 
(-0.46) 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.737** 
(2.16) 
0.190 
(0.92) 
0.069 
(0.22) 
0.307** 
(1.94) 
Drifter 0.706** 
(2.49) 
0.098 
(0.64) 
-0.147 
(-0.52) 
0.210 
(1.58) 
Dictatorship 0.358 
(1.30) 
0.130 
(0.81) 
-0.024 
(-0.08) 
0.086 
(0.62) 
Overall 0.745*** 
(3.55) 
0.121 
(1.14) 
-0.043 
(-0.02) 
 
 
Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.238 
(0.62) 
-0.008 
(-0.00) 
0.173 
(0.51) 
0.101 
(0.50) 
Drifter -0.068 
(-0.22) 
0.234 
(1.15) 
-0.272 
(-1.14) 
-0.010 
(-0.07) 
Dictatorship 0.270 
(0.83) 
0.083 
(0.46) 
0.369 
(1.18) 
0.160 
(1.03) 
Overall 0.035 
(0.15) 
0.127 
(0.76) 
-0.014 
(-0.07) 
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Table 5: Accruals reversal (Dechow et al, 1996) and future stock returns  
Table 5 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are 
sorted two-dimensionally by governance and accruals reversal ACCREVt+1 (measured as the difference between accruals in 
the current period and accruals in the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as TACC in equation (3) in Dechow 
et al (1996) model) that were described in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 
1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months 
when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM 
(2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as 
firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on 
average as compared to the original 9 percent. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship 
(bad governance), now comprising 20.0 percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the 
sample on average. The magnitude of ACCREVt+1 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the 
end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the 
monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREVt+1 is given an 
accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals 
reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed 
Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive 
Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the 
sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy 0.052 
(0.23) 
0.195 
(1.17) 
0.182 
(0.72) 
0.139 
(1.11) 
Drifter -0.144 
(-0.70) 
0.092 
(0.71) 
0.108 
(0.54) 
0.090 
(0.92) 
Dictatorship 0.052 
(0.22) 
0.182* 
(1.68) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.117 
(1.13) 
Overall -0.061 
(-0.41) 
0.123 
(1/40) 
0.100 
(0.67) 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy 0.386 
(1/28) 
0.053 
(0.25) 
0.686** 
(2.12) 
0.307** 
(1.94) 
Drifter -0.130 
(-0.40) 
0.191 
(1.45) 
0.285 
(1.09) 
0.210 
(1.58) 
Dictatorship -0.027 
(-0.07) 
0.142 
(1.01) 
0.004 
(1.37) 
0.086 
(0.62) 
Overall 0.071 
(0.31) 
0.148 
(1.59) 
0.379** 
(2.02) 
 
 
Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy -0.088 
(-0.26) 
0.257 
(0.95) 
0.082 
(0.21) 
0.101 
(0.50) 
Drifter -0.296 
(-1.11) 
0.044 
(0.19) 
-0.021 
(-0.07) 
-0.010 
(-0.07) 
Dictatorship 0.044 
(0.14) 
0.237 
(1.37) 
-0.199 
(-0.66) 
0.160 
(1.03) 
Overall -0.196 
(-1.00) 
0.111 
(0.73) 
0.060 
(0.27) 
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Table 6: Comparison of firm characteristics sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals for 1991 
to 2008  
Table 6 report the firm characteristics of the three categories of portfolio sorted two-dimensionally by governance and 
abnormal accruals. Market cap (in millions) is calculated monthly as shares outstanding times the month-end share price. 
Turnover is the monthly number of shares traded relative to the number of shares outstanding. BM or book-to-market is the 
book value equity per share relative to the month-end share price. PE or price-earnings ratio is end-of-fiscal-year share price 
relative to EPS. Div or dividend yield is dividend per share relative to share price. ROA or return on assets is income before 
extraordinary items relative to average total assets. Leverage is total net debt relative to total assets. R&D is research and 
expenditure expense relative to sales. Capex1 is capital expenditure relative to sales. Capex2 is capital expenditure relative to 
average total assets. Deferred Revenue is deferred current revenue (Compustat item DRC) relative to average total assets. 
Special Item is special items relative to average total assets. N is the number of firm-months. Means tests are based on time-
series of monthly cross-sectional means. Abnormal Accrual is calculated from the residual in Dechow and Dichev (2002) 
model. 
 
Panel A: Democracy-Low AA Vs. Democracy-High AA 
 Democracy-Low AA 
(N = 7887) 
Democracy-High AA 
(N = 6913) 
Means t-test 
 Mean Median Mean Median p-value 
Market cap 3675.930 630.576 4654.919 903.396 < .01 
Price 23.712 19.625 27.472 23.438 < .01 
Turnover 1.605 1.002 1.778 1.110 < .01 
BM 0.615 0.461 0.496 0.380 < .01 
PE  20.802 17.293 21.817 17.279 0.563 
Div 0.015 0.000 0.009 0.000 < .01 
Sales Growth 0.086 0.058 0.205 0.131 < .01 
ROAt-1 0.028 0.046 0.029 0.064 0.734 
ROAt 0.015 0.037 0.071 0.078 < .01 
ROAt+1 0.039 0.052 0.058 0.072 < .01 
Leverage 0.073 0.047 0.061 0.044 < .01 
R&D 0.188 0.000 0.392 0.006 < .01 
Capex1 0.086 0.039 0.116 0.048 < .01 
Capex2 0.060 0.043 0.074 0.056 < .01 
Deferred Revenue 0.010 0.000 0.006 0.000 < .01 
Special Item -0.021 0.000 -0.010 0.000 < .01 
Abnormal accruals -0.033 -0.024 0.030 0.023 < .01 
 
Panel B: Democracy-Low AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA 
 Democracy-Low AA 
(N = 7887) 
Dictatorship-Low AA 
(N = 4085) 
Means t-test 
 Mean Median Mean Median p-value 
Market cap 3675.930 630.576 3787.157 1039.968 0.712 
Price 23.712 19.625 28.621 25.25 < .01 
Turnover 1.605 1.002 1.117 0.821 < .01 
BM 0.615 0.461 0.579 0.458 0.060 
PE  20.802 17.293 28.336 17.588 < .01 
Div 0.015 0.000 0.024 0.016 < .01 
Sales Growth 0.086 0.058 0.079 0.042 0.242 
ROAt-1 0.028 0.046 0.032 0.039 0.034 
ROAt 0.015 0.037 0.027 0.032 < .01 
ROAt+1 0.039 0.052 0.047 0.048 < .01 
Leverage 0.073 0.047 0.203 0.232 < .01 
R&D 0.188 0.000 0.039 0.006 < .01 
Capex1 0.086 0.039 0.053 0.034 < .01 
Capex2 0.060 0.043 0.049 0.039 < .01 
Deferred Revenue 0.010 0.000 0.004 0.000 < .01 
Special Item -0.021 0.000 -0.019 -0.003 0.125 
Abnormal accruals -0.033 -0.024 -0.027 -0.020 < .01 
 
40 
 
Panel C: Drifter-Low AA Vs. Drifter-High AA 
 
 
Drifter-Low AA 
(N = 12167) 
Drifter-High AA 
(N = 10913) 
Means t-test 
 Mean Median Mean Median p-value 
Market cap 4455.748 916.934 4007.792 950.213 < .01 
Price 26.627 21.930 27.391 22.880 0.073 
Turnover 1.694 1.120 1.650 1.033 < .01 
BM 0.558 0.445 0.523 0.422 < .01 
PE  11.477 15.834 16.175 16.169 0.037 
Div 0.013 0.000 0.012 0.000 < .01 
Sales Growth 0.056 0.041 0.171 0.103 < .01 
ROAt-1 0.017 0.040 0.025 0.051 < .01 
ROAt 0.003 0.031 0.054 0.064 < .01 
ROAt+1 0.033 0.047 0.041 0.057 < .01 
Leverage 0.109 0.115 0.106 0.124 0.453 
R&D 0.243 0.013 0.311 0.014 0.288 
Capex1 0.070 0.038 0.096 0.045 < .01 
Capex2 0.054 0.039 0.065 0.050 < .01 
Deferred Revenue 0.011 0.000 0.007 0.000 < .01 
Special Item -0.027 -0.003 -0.013 0.000 < .01 
Abnormal accruals -0.031 -0.022 0.029 0.022 < .01 
 
Panel D: Democracy-High AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA 
 Democracy-High AA 
(N = 6913) 
Dictatorship-High AA 
(N = 3586) 
Means t-test 
 Mean Median Mean Median p-value 
Market cap 4654.919 903.396 5835.055 1381.182 < .01 
Price 27.472 23.438 31.896 28.125 < .01 
Turnover 1.778 1.110 1.158 0.752 < .01 
BM 0.496 0.380 0.508 0.451 0.387 
PE  21.817 17.279 17.283 15.227 < .01 
Div 0.009 0.000 0.019 0.016 < .01 
Sales Growth 0.205 0.131 0.109 0.085 < .01 
ROAt-1 0.029 0.064 0.048 0.052 < .01 
ROAt 0.071 0.078 0.064 0.063 < .01 
ROAt+1 0.058 0.072 0.055 0.059 0.285 
Leverage 0.061 0.044 0.184 0.204 < .01 
R&D 0.392 0.006 0.030 0.007 < .01 
Capex1 0.116 0.048 0.056 0.041 < .01 
Capex2 0.074 0.056 0.055 0.048 < .01 
Deferred Revenue 0.006 0.000 0.000 0.000 < .01 
Special Item -0.010 0.000 -0.011 0.000 0.177 
Abnormal accruals 0.030 0.023 0.027 0.022 < .01 
 
Panel E: Dictatorship-Low AA Vs. Dictatorship-High AA 
 Dictatorship-Low AA 
(N = 4085) 
Dictatorship-High AA 
(N = 3586) 
Means t-test 
 Mean Median Mean Median p-value 
Market cap 3787.157 1039.968 5835.055 1381.182 < .01 
Price 28.621 25.25 31.896 28.125 < .01 
Turnover 1.117 0.821 1.158 0.752 < .01 
BM 0.579 0.458 0.508 0.451 < .01 
PE  28.336 17.588 17.283 15.227 < .01 
Div 0.024 0.016 0.019 0.016 < .01 
Sales Growth 0.079 0.042 0.109 0.085 < .01 
ROAt-1 0.032 0.039 0.048 0.052 < .01 
ROAt 0.027 0.032 0.064 0.063 < .01 
ROAt+1 0.047 0.048 0.055 0.059 < .01 
Leverage 0.203 0.232 0.184 0.204 < .01 
R&D 0.039 0.006 0.030 0.007 < .01 
Capex1 0.053 0.034 0.056 0.041 0.129 
Capex2 0.049 0.039 0.055 0.048 < .01 
Deferred Revenue 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 < .01 
Special Item -0.019 -0.003 -0.011 0.000 < .01 
Abnormal accruals -0.027 -0.020 0.027 0.022 < .01 
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Table 7: Monthly alphas of portfolios sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (Dechow and 
Dichev, 2002, without “look-ahead bias”) 
Table 7 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. Stocks formed in 
the portfolios are sorted two-dimensionally by governance and abnormal accruals (AA, measured by Dechow and Dichev 
(2002) model). Stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 
2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months when new data on G-Index are available. I 
extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM (2003) by including firms with qualitatively 
similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. 
Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on average as compared to the original 9 percent. 
Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship (bad governance), now comprising 20.0 
percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The remaining mixed governance firms, termed 
Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the sample on average. For the stocks sorted by EQ, 
ten decile portfolios ranked by the magnitude of the residuals in the Dechow and Dichev (2002) model are formed three 
months after the end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available. The portfolio of firms 
with the lowest (highest) value in residuals is given an AA score of 1 (10). Similar to the approach used in sorting the firms 
into the three categories of governance structures, the group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as “Low or 
Income-Decreasing Abnormal Accruals (AA)”; those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as “Mixed AA”; and finally, 
those with a score of 8 and above are classified as “High or Income-Increasing AA”. Panel A describes the overall sample 
period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as 
in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008. All standard errors are 
White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 
10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.543** 
(1.92) 
-0.053 
(-0.21) 
0.309 
(0.90) 
0.213 
(1.15) 
Drifter 0.549* 
(1.84) 
0.060 
(0.46) 
-0.253 
(-1.05) 
0.054 
(0.41) 
Dictatorship 0.278 
(1.10) 
-0.158 
(-0.95) 
0.163 
(0.57) 
0.007 
(0.05) 
Overall 0.473** 
(2.24) 
-0.043 
(-0.40) 
0.010 
(0.05) 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.712* 
(1.85) 
-0.201 
(-0.57) 
0.652* 
(1.72) 
0.194 
(0.92) 
Drifter 0.739* 
(1.91) 
0.072 
(0.44) 
-0.312 
(-0.84) 
0.057 
(0.38) 
Dictatorship 0.416 
(1.35) 
-0.017 
(-0.10) 
0.093 
(0.24) 
0.061 
(0.40) 
Overall 0.691*** 
(2.61) 
-0.073 
(-0.55) 
0.196 
(0.83) 
 
 
Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Low AA  Mixed AA High AA Overall 
Democracy 0.246 
(0.59) 
0.253 
(0.67) 
0.307 
(0.52) 
0.275 
(0.93) 
Drifter 0.437 
(0.92) 
0.178 
(0.83) 
-0.138 
(-0.42) 
0.154 
(0.70) 
Dictatorship 0.072 
(0.19) 
-0.165 
(-0.57) 
0.445 
(1.05) 
0.028 
(0.12) 
Overall 0.204 
(0.60) 
0.101 
(0.57) 
-0.008 
(-0.03) 
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Table 8: Accruals reversal (Dechow and Dichev, 2002, without “look-ahead bias”) and future stock returns  
Table 8 reports the portfolios‟ value-weighted monthly alphas, estimated using Fama-French (1993) three-factor model and 
includes the Carhart (1997) momentum factor from WRDS.  
Rt = α + β1RMRFt + β2SMBt + β3HMLt + β4UMDt + εt 
The dependent variable is the value-weighted monthly portfolio excess return Rt. The explanatory variables RMRF, SMB, 
HML and UMD are the returns to zero-investment portfolios designed to capture market, size, book-to-market, and 
momentum effects, respectively. The coefficients of these factors are not reported in the table for brevity. The portfolios are 
sorted two-dimensionally by governance and accruals reversal ACCREVt+1 (measured as the difference between accruals in 
the current period and accruals in the previous period, with the accruals being estimated as ∆WC in equation (2) in Dechow 
and Dichev (2002) model) that were described in Section 3. The stocks sorted by governance are reset in September 1990, 
July 1993, July 1995, February 1998, February 2000, February 2002, January 2004, and January 2006, which are the months 
when new data on G-Index are available. I extended the sample size of the Democracy (good governance) portfolio in GIM 
(2003) by including firms with qualitatively similar positive monthly alphas and re-grouping the Democracy portfolio as 
firms with a G-Index score of 7 or less. Following this, Democracy firms now comprise 27.9 percent of the sample on 
average as compared to the original 9 percent. Similarly, I re-classified firms with a G-Index of 12 and above as Dictatorship 
(bad governance), now comprising 20.0 percent of the sample on average, as compared to the original 5.5 percent. The 
remaining mixed governance firms, termed Drifter, have a G-Index between 8 and 11 and comprise 52.1 percent of the 
sample on average. The magnitude of ACCREVt+1 is sorted and ranked to form ten decile portfolios three months after the 
end of each fiscal year to ensure that the financial statements are publicly available, and then they are matched with the 
monthly CRSP returns in period t+1. The portfolio of firms with the lowest (highest) value in ACCREVt+1 is given an 
accruals reversal score of 1 (10). The group of firms with a score of 3 and below is re-classified as big net negative accruals 
reversal (Negative Accruals Reversal); those with a score between 4 and 7 are classified as mixed accruals reversal (Mixed 
Accruals Reversal); and finally, those with a score of 8 and above are classified as big net positive accruals reversal (Positive 
Accruals Reversal). Panel A describes the overall sample period from September 1990 to December 2008; Panel B is the 
sub-period from September 1, 1991 to December 31, 1999 as in GIM (2003); and Panel C is the post-GIM sub-period from 
January 1, 2000 to December 31, 2008.  All standard errors are White (1980) robust and the t-statistics are reported in 
parentheses. Levels of significance are indicated by *, **, *** for 10%, 5%, and 1% respectively. 
 
Panel A: Overall sample period Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy 0.258 
(0.79) 
0.040 
(0.21) 
0.787** 
(2.09) 
0.213 
(1.15) 
Drifter 0.139 
(0.55) 
0.016 
(0.12) 
0.095 
(0.39) 
0.054 
(0.41) 
Dictatorship 0.180 
(0.68) 
0.074 
(0.44) 
-0.146 
(-0.52) 
0.007 
(0.05) 
Overall 0.190 
(0.99) 
0.011 
(0.11) 
0.209 
(0.98) 
 
 
Panel B: Sub-period (1) Sep 1, 1991 – Dec 31, 1999 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy 0.701* 
(1.87) 
-0.025 
(-0.09) 
0.564 
(1.36) 
0.194 
(0.92) 
Drifter -0.129 
(-0.37) 
0.143 
(0.91) 
0.164 
(0.49) 
0.057 
(0.38) 
Dictatorship -0.075 
(-0.19) 
0.213 
(0.92) 
0.170 
(0.46) 
0.061 
(0.40) 
Overall 0.244 
(1.05) 
0.071 
(0.57) 
0.141 
(0.61) 
 
 
Panel C: Sub-period (2) Jan 1, 2000 – Dec 31, 2008 
Portfolios Positive 
ACCREV 
Mixed 
ACCREV 
Negative 
ACCREV 
Overall 
Democracy 0.097 
(0.18) 
0.010 
(0.04) 
1.051* 
(1.67) 
0.275 
(0.93) 
Drifter 0.241 
(0.62) 
0.037 
(0.16) 
0.152 
(0.41) 
0.154 
(0.70) 
Dictatorship 0.462 
(1.24) 
0.088 
(0.35) 
-0.289 
(-0.64) 
0.028 
(0.12) 
Overall 0.144 
(0.45) 
0.023 
(0.13) 
0.307 
(0.86) 
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